This thesis presents and critically evaluates Boudon's Theory of Ordinary Rationality (TOR). The basic hypothesis of TOR is that human actions and beliefs are the consequences of the reasons we have for those actions and beliefs. This thesis presents the assumptions and theoretical goals of TOR. Based on these, it argues that TOR has many theoretical advantages but also some serious problems. The most important of these are the questionable explanatory power of TOR and the possibility that it is an unfalsifiable theory. The thesis also presents two competing theories: rational choice theory and dual process theory. Rational Choice Theory offers an interesting comparison with TOR, as it also explains human behaviour in rational terms, but has a much narrower notion of rationality. In this way it avoids many of the problems of TOR, but because of its narrow conception of rationality it cannot offer a general model of human behaviour. Dual process theories, however, offer an interesting comparison, since they claim that only part of human behaviour is rational. The thesis concludes that TOR is most useful as part of a broader theory of human behaviour that also includes the two competing theories mentioned above. In integrating these theories, the findings of the dual process theories are likely to be particularly relevant with respect to when human behaviour can be expected to be rational and when it cannot.
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