The paper deals with the issues of evidence for our beliefs or the ethics of belief, with a specific focus being on the problem of disagreement. What does the existence of a disagreement between me and others mean for the rationality of accepting the belief in question that is the subject of disagreement? In connection with this, we advocate the view that the mere existence of such disagreement does not necessarily mean that it is most (or even only) rational to abandon our belief, especially in the case of religious beliefs. The latter can be linked to a primary level of rationality, which we call experiential rationality and which, to a large extent, also includes evidential support that one cannot necessarily express explicitly or communicate. This aspect often plays a vital role in a situation of disagreement. At the same time, this topic is related to the thought of Hartmut Rosa, especially his theory of resonance and his thesis about the forms of new identities that result from the social acceleration of time. The latter identities are very important from the point of view of individual beliefs and rationality. The theory of resonance also offers means for understanding the aspect, according to which disagreement itself is an inherent building block of resonance and not something that the latter excludes or eliminates. At the end, on this basis of all this, a new illumination of some challenges of modern times, such as epistemic bubbles, echo chambers, and epistemic aspects of identity politics, is put forward.
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