Public enforcement within the EU system of competition enforcement has a much stronger role compared to private enforcement in the form of actions for damages. Leniency policy, which offers immunity from fines or reduction of fines to members of cartels in exchange for their cooperation, presents an important tool to public bodies in detecting and punishing the most serious violations of competition law. Despite of its marginal role, the meaning of private enforcement is strengthening and evolving and thus requests for access to documents submitted to leniency programmes are increasing. Crucial among the latter are corporate leniency statements, which contain important information about the cartel that would make it easier for private plaintiffs to prove the facts of the infringement in court. The recent case law regarding the disclosure of documents from leniency programmes and the adoption of the Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union points to a trend of non-disclosure of such documents to private litigants and also partly indicates the dominance of public law enforcement towards the private enforcement.