The master’s thesis examines the substance of the AUKUS partnership, under which the US and the UK will assist Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, making Australia the first non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) to possess such capabilities. The naval nuclear reactors will use highly-enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel, which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) classifies as weapons-grade material. Access by an NNWS to HEU is not, in itself, problematic, as HEU is also used for peaceful purposes. Nuclear material used in peaceful activities is subject to IAEA safeguards, which ensure that NNWS do not divert such material from peaceful nuclear programmes to the production of nuclear weapons. The particularity of the AUKUS partnership is Australia’s use of HEU in the context of a military activity. Based on an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the author concludes that claims of the AUKUS partnership’s non-compliance with the NPT have no basis in international law, as the transfer of nuclear material for the purpose of naval nuclear propulsion does not violate any NPT obligations. At the same time, the author recognises that naval nuclear propulsion will pose a significant challenge to the international non-proliferation regime, as three NNWS have initiated negotiations with the IAEA to conclude arrangements allowing the withdrawal of naval nuclear reactors from safeguards. Such agreements will mark a departure from the practice established since the entry into force of the NPT, under which IAEA safeguards have been applied to all nuclear activities in NNWS. In this context, the IAEA must consider that these agreements will establish a new practice to which all states may refer in the future.
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