This master’s thesis examines the phenomenon of the “revolving door” as a significant risk factor for corruption. The main objective is to assess the effectiveness of the Slovenian regulatory framework and to analyse possibilities for its improvement.
The theoretical part presents key concepts (corruption, integrity, conflict of interest) and analyses the main theories explaining the impact of revolving doors on regulators, particularly regulatory capture theory, human capital theory, and market expansion theory. Empirical studies are also considered, showing that the phenomenon may have both negative effects (state capture, biased decision-making) and positive effects (knowledge transfer, higher-quality personnel, increased institutional efficiency).
The analysis of the Slovenian framework reveals that it is insufficient, as it does not cover all relevant actors, lacks flexibility, and does not ensure adequate oversight and transparency. A comparative overview of EU member states highlights effective solutions such as notification obligations regarding changes in employment, stricter supervision, and a broader range of sanctions.
Based on the analysis, both initial hypotheses (that the current regulation in Slovenia is not sufficiently effective and there already exist solutions capable of reducing its shortcomings) are confirmed, and several improvements are proposed, including expanding the scope of regulated actors, increasing the flexibility of cooling-off periods, strengthening oversight, and enhancing transparency. The thesis concludes regulation alone cannot eliminate negative effects; improving individual integrity and legal and political culture and are also essential.
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