This thesis evaluates the concept of the rule of law within Objectivist philosophy. Even though Objectivism puts emphasis on topics that are relevant to legal science (such as the limits of state power and individual rights), its implications for the rule of law have not received a lot of attention in contemporary legal philosophy. The thesis aims to reconstruct the Objectivist conception of the rule of law by observing the primary philosophical sources and placing them into general legal debates. The thesis argues that Objectivism holds a distinctive position in legal philosophy, rejecting both legal formalism and moralised judicial discretion. It grounds legal constraints on the state in a comprehensive philosophical system where political and legal ideas are based in the conclusions of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Individual rights are seen as moral principles that precede the positive law rather than legal constructs, and the rule of law is viewed as the institutional mechanism through which arbitrary force is systematically excluded from society. The thesis situates this idea within the classical liberal tradition through a comparative analysis of the philosophy of John Locke, Friedrich Hayek, and Robert Nozick, identifying similarities and differences between them. It concludes that while the Objectivist model offers solid internal coherence and a clear moral foundation for legal institutions, it also faces some unresolved tensions, especially regarding the state’s emergency powers and voluntary financing of the government.
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