Given the specific risks that the operation and activities of banks pose to the financial and economic system, normal insolvency proceedings are not suitable for their winding-up. Prior to the global financial crisis, the legal framework governing bank insolvency did not systematically address the need to preserve financial stability, while depositor protection remained limited. In response to these shortcomings, the European Union established the Single Resolution Mechanism together with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, which provide a special framework for the resolution of failing banks. Their objective is to ensure the timely and effective management of banking crises, safeguard financial stability, preserve critical functions of banks, and limit the use of public funds. Nevertheless, the Single Resolution Mechanism is not self-sufficient. Its application continues to require reliance on national insolvency law, which has not been harmonised within this framework. Fundamental issues, such as the conduct of normal insolvency proceedings, the conditions for their commencement, and the hierarchy of claims, thus largely remain within the discretion of the Member States. Although the Single Resolution Mechanism represents significant progress in addressing financial crises, its dependence on diverse national legal frameworks reduces its unity, effectiveness, and predictability. These findings are also confirmed by the legal framework in the Republic of Slovenia and Slovenia’s long-standing experience with bank resolution and liquidation proceedings. On the basis of the Slovenian regulation under the Resolution and Compulsory Winding-Up of Banks Act and practical experience with bank failures, this thesis argues that further harmonisation of (bank) insolvency law would contribute to greater uniformity and predictability of both the European and national bank resolution frameworks.
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