Statutory law regulates the grounds for returning gifts after the conclusion of a donation contract, typically invoked following the performance of the contract—specifically, after the delivery of the object to the donee. These statutory grounds do not invalidate the contract at the conclusion stage and do not require an agreement between the contracting parties. Therefore, they represent statutory, non-consensual grounds for returning gifts after the conclusion and performance of the donation contract, despite the opposition or lack of consent from the donee.
The statutory grounds can be reasonably divided into four substantive groups based on their legislative purpose: (1) gross ingratitude, (2) failure to fulfil a condition or legal obligation, (3) changes in circumstance, and (4) the protection of third-party interests.
This thesis examines the aforementioned legal grounds for returning gifts to determine whether these exceptions to the principles of pacta sunt servanda and the freedom of contract are justified by the legitimate aim of safeguarding the legal position of donors or their creditors, while limiting interference with legal certainty, the legal position of the counterparty, and the obligations assumed to the minimum possible degree.
From a broader conceptual perspective, this thesis analyses the gift as a social phenomenon, aiming to evaluate the reasonableness of the legislative purpose behind the statutory regulation of gifts and the appropriateness of specific solutions within that regulation
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