In this thesis I argue that thinking acts are equal to any other action, that they are essentially spontaneous, and that they appear to the agent as a phenomenon. I expand on the core arguments of late Wittgenstein, in particular his analysis of rule-following, life forms, and private language argument, with concepts from biosemiotics, phenomenology, and pragmatism.
I locate individual thoughts (and acts in general) within the agent’s Umwelt, which I interpret as a field of affordances, i.e. dispositions for action. I show how a rule appears, to an agent, as an objective part of his world, despite originating in his life form, which is not only biological, but rather also (and with some agents, mostly) socially mediated, and, thus, has its own history.
To conclude, I explain how all life forms remain subject to change and development, but also how the anthropologisation of thought does not lead to relativism, rather showing the need for ongoing opening of new problem areas.
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