The paper addresses the established dichotomy between legal rules and legal principles as distinct forms of norms within the legal order. Relying on Dworkin’s and Alexy’s theories, it seeks to answer questions concerning the function of legal principles, their normative character, and the ways in which they appear and can be identified in law. The discussion then turns to the problematic assumption that a clear-cut distinction can be drawn between rules and principles, and examines in what manner such a distinction can be established on a qualitative level. Furthermore, the paper critically examines Alexy’s and Barak’s theories of human rights in order to explore whether and how the concepts of rights and principles are compatible. In conclusion, it presents Dworkin’s theory of rights as trumps and, through Habermas’s critique and an analysis of situations in which individuals invoke human rights, demonstrates how human rights can be ascribed a definitive nature.
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