This master's thesis examines the discretionary clause in the Dublin procedures as a legal mechanism that allows Member States to derogate from the binding criteria for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application. This exception to the mandatory rules on responsibility is intended to permit flexibility in exceptional circumstances, particularly where strict application of the criteria would lead to violations of fundamental rights of asylum seekers. Through an analysis of the EU legal framework and the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the thesis explores the relationship between state sovereignty and supranational human rights obligations. Special attention is given to the question of whether, and to what extent, the clause actually functions as an effective safeguard for fundamental rights. The findings indicate that the discretionary clause is rarely used as a protective mechanism for asylum seekers, and although the case law of the CJEU (as well as the ECtHR) acknowledges the importance of fundamental rights in its application, it consistently upholds the wide margin of discretion afforded to Member States. In this context, the thesis further provides a critical assessment of the changes introduced by the new Dublin IV Regulation.
The thesis provides a comprehensive insight into the discretionary clause, its legal nature, scope, and limitations, analyses its role in the protection of individual rights, and highlights the legal and political challenges in balancing state sovereignty with the obligation to respect fundamental rights within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
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