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Ustavnopravni vidiki imenovanja sodnikov v Sloveniji
ID Krabonja, Andreja (Avtor), ID Kaučič, Igor (Mentor) Več o mentorju... Povezava se odpre v novem oknu

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Izvleček
Neodvisno in učinkovito sodstvo je eden od temeljnih pogojev za delovanje pravne države. Zato je pomembno, kako se sodna oblast oblikuje. Imenovanje sodnikov naslavljajo številni zavezujoči in nezavezujoči mednarodnopravni instrumenti, iz katerih izhaja skupna zahteva, da mora imenovanje sodnikov temeljiti na objektivnih, transparentnih in zgolj strokovnih (nepolitičnih) kriterijih. Enako zahtevo postavljata tudi Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice (v nadaljevanju ESČP) in Sodišče Evropske unije (v nadaljevanju SEU). V evropskem primerjalnem pravu poznamo štiri sisteme imenovanja oziroma volitev sodnikov, vendar je sistem neposrednih volitev sodnikov izjema, ki jo pozna le Švica. Trije najpogostejši sistemi imenovanja sodnikov so: 1) sistem, v katerem sodnike imenuje izvršilna oblast, 2) sistem, v katerem sodnike imenuje zakonodajna oblast, in 3) sistem, v katerem sodnike imenuje sodni svet. V Sloveniji sodnike voli oziroma imenuje Državni zbor, torej zakonodajna oblast, na predlog Sodnega sveta. Ta sistem načeloma zagotavlja spoštovanje stališč ESČP in SEU ter zahtev oziroma priporočil, ki izhajajo iz mednarodnopravnih instrumentov. Vendar pa imenovanje sodnikov v Državnem zboru, ki je političen organ par excellence, že po definiciji dopušča možnost politizacije imenovanja sodnikov in posledično politizacijo sodstva. Zato je ustavna ureditev volitev sodnikov pogosto predmet kritik in prizadevanj po njeni spremembi. Z vidika bolj uravnoteženega vpliva vseh treh oblasti v postopku imenovanja sodnikov se kot bolj ustrezna sistema od veljavnega nakazujeta zlasti sistem, v katerem bi sodnike imenoval Predsednik republike na predlog Sodnega sveta, pa tudi sistem, v katerem bi bil tako za izbiro kot za končno imenovanje sodnikov pristojen Sodni svet. Zlasti v slednjem primeru bi bilo smiselno spremeniti tudi sestavo oziroma način oblikovanja Sodnega sveta. V doktorski disertaciji so podani predlogi rešitev, ki pomenijo de lege ferenda podlago za ustreznejšo ureditev imenovanja sodnikov. Ti predlogi so bili oblikovani ob upoštevanju mednarodnopravnih standardov in primerjalnopravnih izkušenj v nekaterih evropskih državah.

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:imenovanje sodnikov, razrešitev sodnikov, ustava, državni zbor, sodni svet, predsednik republike, neodvisnost sodnikov, načelo delitve oblasti, sistem zavor in ravnovesij, načelo ljudske suverenosti, načelo demokratičnosti, pravna država
Vrsta gradiva:Doktorsko delo/naloga
Organizacija:PF - Pravna fakulteta
Leto izida:2024
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-159400 Povezava se odpre v novem oknu
Datum objave v RUL:09.07.2024
Število ogledov:96
Število prenosov:16
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Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Angleški jezik
Naslov:Constitutional Aspects of the Appointment of Judges in Slovenia
Izvleček:
An independent judiciary is one of the basic conditions for the functioning of a state governed by the rule of law. The manner in which the judiciary is constituted is therefore important. A number of binding and non-binding international legal instruments, which address the appointment of judges, imply the common requirement that the appointment of judges be based on objective, transparent and exclusively professional (i.e. non-political) criteria. The ECtHR and the CJEU also developed the same requirement. Four systems of appointment of judges can be found in European comparative law, and even among those the system of direct election of judges constitutes and exception that is established only in Switzerland. The three most common systems for the appointment of judges are thus 1) a system wherein judges are appointed by the executive, 2) a system wherein judges are appointed by the legislature, and 3) a system wherein judges are appointed by the judicial council. In Slovenia, judges are elected by the National Assembly, i.e. the legislature, upon the proposal of the Judicial Council. This system ensures, in principle, that the positions of the ECtHR and the CJEU as well as the requirements or recommendations arising from international legal instruments are respected. However, the appointment of judges by the National Assembly, which is a political body par excellence, enables the possibility of politicisation of the appointment of judges. As a result, the constitutional regulation of the election of judges has often been the subject of criticism and attempts to amend it. In terms of ensuring a more balanced influence of all three branches of power within the judicial appointment process, compared to the system currently in force, in particular a system wherein judges would be appointed by the President of the Republic upon the proposal of the Judicial Council, as well as a system wherein the Judicial Council would be responsible for both the selection and the final appointment of judges, appear more appropriate. If the latter were selected, an amendment of the composition or the method of appointment of the Judicial Council would also be feasible. The doctoral thesis proposes solutions which constitute a de lege ferenda basis for a more appropriate regulation of the appointment of judges. These proposals have been developed taking into account international legal standards and comparative legal experience in selected European countries.

Ključne besede:appointment of judges, dismissal of judges, Constitution, National Assembly, Judicial Council, President of the Republic, independence of judges, principle of separation of powers, system of checks and balances, principle of popular sovereignty

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