The main question discussed in the present master’s thesis emanates from the area of European constitutional law, more specifically from the plane of human rights protection within the European Union (EU) according to European Union law. Here, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter) represents the pivotal document of primary Union law, which is binding on Member States (MS) according to paragraph 1 of Article 51. If we wish to ascertain in a specific case, whether a certain act of a MS is covered by the Charter, a determination is required of how (i.e., to what extend and in what circumstances) MS are truly bound to abide by the Charter in exercising their public authority.
In this regard, an interpretation of the Charter's condition that it is addressed to MS only »when they are implementing Union law« is sought. In examining the meaning and scope of the »implementing Union law« condition, we may rely heavily on the adjudication of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU), other human rights related documents, and on the findings of legal doctrine. As I establish in my thesis, the CJEU interprets the »implementing Union law« condition distinctively theologically, according to the development of the EU and EU law. After examining CJEU jurisprudence on interpreting »implementing Union law«, and relevant expertly literature, I propose an example of a scheme on how to interpret the »implementing Union law« condition in a particular case, naming my proposal »the general rule Åkerberg Fransson – Siragusa for defining the scope of the Charter vis-à-vis Union Member States«. Later-on, I list several areas as an example where, as per settled understanding (and as per the general rule) the Charter applies, and a possible exception.
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