In my master's thesis, I address the issue of the (im)possibility of metaphysical freedom and moral responsibility, with special regard to the infamous argument by the philosopher Galen Strawson. I begin the analysis by outlining the connection between freedom, moral responsibility and the agent's ability to exercise a relevant type of control over themselves and their actions. I distinguish between three essential questions that surround the philosophical debate on freedom: "The question of possibility", "The question of existence" and "The question of compatibility". This is followed by a brief outline of the (contemporary) debate, especially in terms of the mentioned questions. I then offer some additional terminological explanations and define more thoroughly some central concepts of the thesis, such as "compatibilism", "incompatibilism", "libertarianism", "impossibilism", "determinism" and "moral responsibility". At the centre of the debate is the freedom that is necessary for moral responsibility in the sense of "basic", non-pragmatically understood desert. What follows is a presentation of Strawson's "basic argument" (BA), which seeks to prove the impossibility of such freedom. I distinguish between four basic versions of the argument and present them in more detail one by one. I then outline some fundamental philosophical judgments on the BA. I start with compatibilist objections, where I focus on the objection by Justin D. Coates, continue with incompatibilist or libertarian objections, where I concentrate on the objection by Richard Swinburne, and conclude with impossibilist defences, where I highlight the defences by Neil Levy and Michael Anthony Istvan Jr. I conclude my work on the side of the "possibilists". I aim to show that impossibilist arguments such as Strawson's BA are not convincing and that the freedom required for the relevant type of moral responsibility can exist (i.e., it is metaphysically and logically possible). Finally, I reject the "monist" view that either compatibilism or incompatibilism is true and offer a defence of "fundamental dualism", which asserts both the partial truth of compatibilism and the partial truth of incompatibilism. What follows is a brief account of Saul Smilansky's "pessimistic" dualism, which insists on the impossibility of a deeper type of freedom incompatible with the reality of determinism. Contrary to this view, I allow the possibility of a partial truth of libertarianism and consequently the possible existence of freedom, which can, on the one hand, significantly upgrade shallower types of freedom compatible with the reality of determinism and, on the other hand, serve as a deeper justification for many of our everyday (self)attributions of freedom and moral responsibility.
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