In my dissertation, I look at a story of a particular case of domestic violence according to the victim's testimony, proceeding from which I discuss various definitions of violence. Based on the victim's internal events, I conclude that violence should be treated primarily as desubjectivation, i.e. as attribution of meaning, and not primarily as suffered physical damage. After discussing the specifics and paradoxes of communication of violence, I examine the conditions of the possibility of the subject's vulnerability for such a communicative determination. I find the theoretical basis of the subject's susceptibility to the way of being addressed by the Other in the transcendental necessity of intersubjective recognition, whereas the example of the victim's struggle for liberation from the perpetrator's attribution of meaning also shows a certain simultaneity of the subject's autonomy. In response to this duality, I first present Honneth’s proposal, which relies on the notion of action theory of emotions. I also outline his social theory of the subject’s gradual development with respect to intersubjective recognition and gradual decay with respect to denial of this recognition. Since Honneth's social theory does not include the constitutive role of subject's corporeality in dealing with the experience of violence, although it seems to presuppose it, I finally resort to the philosophical corporeal phenomenology, which offers a new conception of subject's inner duality between dependence and independence of the Other and, by substantiating the subject in embodied intentionality, captures the far-reaching impact of violent intrusion on victim's subjectivity.
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