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Institut cenovnih škarij v konkurenčnem pravu
Mitrović, Dušan (Avtor), Vlahek, Ana (Mentor) Več o mentorju... Povezava se odpre v novem oknu, Kovač, Mitja (Komentor)

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Izvleček
Disertacija preučuje cenovne škarje kot obliko zlorabe prevladujočega položaja. Gre za cenovno politiko vertikalno integriranih podjetij, s katero lahko svoje konkurente učinkovito izključujejo s trga. Namen te disertacije je odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali pomeni takšno izključevanje nedovoljeno zlorabo prevladujočega položaja ali povsem zakonito tekmovanje na račun učinkovitosti. Vprašanje je izrazito aktualno tako s praktičnega vidika, saj so primeri cenovnih škarij na ravni EU in na ravni držav članic vedno bolj pogosti, kot tudi s primerjalnopravnega vidika. Na to vprašanje sta namreč ob povsem primerljvi pravni podlagi in praktično enakih obravnavanih dejanskih stanovih Zvezno vrhovno sodišče ZDA in Sodišče EU v aktualni sodni praksi podali bistveno drugačna odgovora. Medtem ko so v ZDA cenovne škarje obravnavane kot dovoljena oblika cenovnega pritiska na manj učinkovite konkurente, so v EU tretirane kot izključevalna zloraba prevladujočega položaja. Iskanju odgovora na vprašanje, ali je v EU cenovne škarje ustrezno prepovedovati, služi preizkus hipoteze, da prepoved cenovnih škarij ščiti manj učinkovite konkurente in škoduje blaginji potrošnikov. Cenovna politika podjetja s prevladujočim položajem, ki s trga izriva le manj učinkovite konkurente in koristi ekonomskim interesom potrošnikov, predstavlja namreč prav takšno tržno ravnanje, ki bi ga moralo konkurenčno pravo EU spodbujati, ne pa prepovedovati. Preizkus hipoteze sega v samo srž konkurenčnega prava EU, saj na primeru cenovnih škarij prikaže, da želita Komisija in Sodišče EU s konkurenčnim pravom EU hkrati varovati blaginjo potrošnikov, kot tudi spodbujati enake možnosti podjetij za vstop na skupni trg. Zaradi tega 102. člen PDEU uporabljata kot sredstvo sektorske regulacije, s čimer dolgoročno škodita blaginji potrošnikov in grobo posegata v pravno varnost podjetij s prevladujočim položajem. Namen disertacije je prikazati, da takšna razlaga 102. člena PDEU ni ustrezna in kritiko nadgraditi s predlogom reformnega pristopa do cenovnih škarij v konkurenčnem pravu EU.

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:cenovne škarje, zloraba prevladujočega položaja, vertikalna integracija, pravna varnost, imputacijski test, test enako učinkovitega konkurenta, blaginja potrošnikov, zavrnitev dobave, telekomunikacije, regulirani sektorji
Vrsta gradiva:Doktorsko delo/naloga (mb31)
Organizacija:PF - Pravna fakulteta
Leto izida:2019
COBISS.SI-ID:16842577 Povezava se odpre v novem oknu
Število ogledov:120
Število prenosov:67
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
 
Skupna ocena:(0 glasov)
Vaša ocena:Ocenjevanje je dovoljeno samo prijavljenim uporabnikom.
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Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Angleški jezik
Naslov:Concept of Margin Squeeze in Competition Law
Izvleček:
Term margin squeeze describes a pricing policy of a vertically integrated undertaking, which sets its prices on the upstream market so high and its prices on the downstream market so low that it disables its competitors to earn any margin on the downstream market. According to the European Commission and to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), margin squeeze is a type of exclusive unilateral conduct contrary to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). This dissertation aims to answer the question, whether this European assessment of the margin squeeze phenomenon is correct, or shall margin squeeze rather be considered as a measure of competition-on-merits in line with Article 102 of the TFEU. This is a particularly intriguing topic, since the number of margin squeeze cases in the telecommunications sector has risen dramatically and since the CJEU and the Supreme Court of the US have taken diametrically diverging approaches to margin squeeze in their latest case law. Contrary to the CJEU, the Supreme Court of the US has, while deciding cases with almost the same factual background and applying very similar provisions on abusive unilateral conduct, considered margin squeeze to be a legal measure of exercising price-based market pressure on competitors on the downstream market. The hypothesis set in this dissertation is that the ban of margin squeeze protects less efficient competitors and is detrimental to the welfare of consumers. Namely, by applying this pricing policy, a dominant vertically integrated undertaking can drive out of the downstream market only those competitors which are less cost efficient and which cannot compete with the dominant`s prices on the downstream market. The diverging approaches of the two most developed antitrust legal systems to such pricing policy indicate different objectives of competition law in both legal systems. While antitrust in the US forbids only exclusionary conduct which is detrimental to consumers` welfare, the European Commission and the CJEU interpret Article 102 of the TFEU in a way that it prohibits also exclusionary conduct which is detrimental solely to the welfare of competitors. With such interpretation, concepts of ex ante market regulation, which aim to lower the entry barriers to internal market, are being introduced to EU competition law. The latest case law of the CJEU on margin squeeze clearly shows that such “regulatory” interpretation of Article 102 TFEU interferes with the basic principle of legal certainty and reduces the consumers` welfare. Based on the criticism of the current CJEU case law on margin squeeze, the dissertation seeks to provide an outline of a reform approach to margin squeeze in EU competition law.

Ključne besede:margin squeeze, abuse of dominant position, vertical integration, legal certainty, imputation test, equally efficient competitor test, consumer welfare, refusal to deal, telecommunications, regulated markets

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