Fragments of conscience : rethinking moral emotion and judgment in the confucian Four Books

Pejda, Katarzyna (author)

This paper reconsiders the concept of conscience in the Confucian tradition through an analysis of the Four Books—Lunyu (The Analects), Mengzi (Mencius), Daxue (Great Learning), and Zhongyong 中庸 (On the Practice of the Mean)—within a comparative and interdisciplinary framework. Conscience is reconstructed as a functional constella­tion, with the heart-mind xin (心) and innate moral knowing liang zhi (良知) at its core, activated by moral emotions (especially “shame” (chi 恥), “aversion” (xiu 羞), and “com­passion” (ceyin zhi xin 惻隱之心)) and stabilized through ritual learning, role-reflection, and self-examination. Unlike dominant Western accounts that often portray conscience as an internal, stable, and individual “moral voice”, early Confucian discourse presents moral discernment as a dynamic process cultivated through affective responsiveness, ritu­al practice, and reflection on one’s social roles. Particular attention is given to Mencian moral psychology, where emotions are not merely subjective reactions but action-guid­ing ethical intuitions rooted in the “sprouts” (duan 端) of virtue and oriented toward ren (仁) and yi (義). The analysis argues that Confucian conscience is best understood as a moral habitus: an internalized yet evolving disposition shaped through daily self-culti­vation (xiushen 修身) and relational participation in social life. At the same time, this account preserves the Mencian claim that moral responsiveness was originally endowed: liang zhi is treated as an innate moral orientation whose clarity and efficacy depend on cultivation, ritual habituation, and reflective extension. By bringing early Confucian texts into dialogue with contemporary moral psychology and ethical theory, the paper offers a culturally grounded alternative to reductive universalist models, while acknowledging Confucian aspirations toward moral universality.

• Language: English
• Keywords: early Confucianism, Four Books, conscience, moral emotions, innate moral knowledge (liang zhi), self-cultivation
• Work type: Article
• Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
• Organization: FF - Faculty of Arts
• Publication status: Published
• Publication version: Version of Record
• Year: 2026
• Number of pages: Str. 27-50
• Numbering: Vol. 14, no. 3
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-190606
• ISSN on article: 2232-5131
• DOI: 10.4312/as.2026.14.3.27-50
• Publication date in RUL: 05.11.2026

Record is a part of a journal

• Title: Asian studies = Azijske študije
• Publisher: Založba Univerze v Ljubljani
• ISSN: 2232-5131
• COBISS.SI-ID: 265206272

Licences

• License: CC BY-SA 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
• Link: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
• Description: This Creative Commons license is very similar to the regular Attribution license, but requires the release of all derivative works under this same license.

Secondary language

• Language: Slovenian
• Title: Fragmenti vesti : premislek o moralnih čustvih in presoji v konfucijanskih Šti­rih knjigah

Abstract

Prispevek ponovno premisli pojem vesti v konfucijanski tradiciji skozi analizo Štirih knjig – Lunyu (Razprave), Mengzi (Mencij), Daxue (Veliko učenje) in Zhongyong (Nauk o sredini) – znotraj primerjalnega in interdisciplinarnega okvira. Vest rekonstruira kot funkcionalno konstelacijo, katere jedro tvorita srčna zavest, xin (心), in prirojeno mo­ralno védenje, liang zhi (良知), ki se udejanjata prek moralnih čustev (zlasti »sramu«, (chi 恥), »zadrege« oziroma »moralnega odpora«, (xiu 羞), ter »sočutja« (ceyin zhi xin)) in se stabilizirata z obrednim učenjem, refleksijo družbenih vlog ter samopreizpraševa­njem. V nasprotju s prevladujočimi zahodnimi razlagami, ki vest pogosto prikazujejo kot notranji, stabilni in individualni »moralni glas«, zgodnji konfucijanski diskurz moralno razločevanje predstavlja kot dinamičen proces, ki se oblikuje z afektivno odzivnostjo, obredno prakso in premislekom o lastnih družbenih vlogah. Posebno pozornost prispevek namenja mencijanski moralni psihologiji, v kateri čustva niso zgolj subjektivne reakcije, temveč etične intuicije, ki usmerjajo delovanje in so ukoreninjene v »kalčkih« (duan 端) kreposti ter naravnane k ren (仁) in yi (義). Analiza zagovarja tezo, da je konfucijansko vest najprimerneje razumeti kot moralni habitus: ponotranjeno, toda hkrati razvijajočo se dispozicijo, ki se oblikuje z vsakodnevno samokultivacijo (xiushen 修身) in odnosno so­udeležbo v družbenem življenju. Ob tem takšna razlaga ohranja mencijansko trditev, da je moralna odzivnost izvorno podarjena: liang zhi obravnava kot prirojeno moralno na­ravnanost, katere jasnost in učinkovitost sta odvisni od kultivacije, obredne habituacije in refleksivne razširitve. Z vzpostavitvijo dialoga med zgodnjimi konfucijanskimi besedili ter sodobno moralno psihologijo in etično teorijo prispevek ponuja kulturno umeščeno al­ternativo reduktivnim univerzalističnim modelom, hkrati pa priznava tudi konfucijanske aspiracije k moralni univerzalnosti.

• Keywords: zgodnje konfucijanstvo, Štiri knjige, vest, moralna čustva, prirojeno moralno védenje (liang zhi), samokultivacija