This thesis focuses on the role and limitations of international organizations in preventing genocide,
examining two cases: Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995). It is a
comparative study that seeks to analyze why international organizations failed in these instances. The
aim is to identify the specific circumstances of each case and the political, institutional, and
operational factors that decisively influenced the inability of international actors to act. The study
pays particular attention to power relations, state sovereignty, and political will, and does not
concentrate on the causes of the genocides themselves. It adopts a comparative framework to locate
points of convergence and divergence between the Rwanda and Srebrenica cases.
The thesis employs a qualitative comparative analysis of diverse sources, both primary and
secondary, in order to reveal common causes of international failure and to examine the particular
circumstances of each case. The central research questions are: How did institutional mandates,
political decisions, and operational conditions of international organizations affect their performance
in Rwanda and Srebrenica? Which structural and political factors constrained the UN’s ability to
protect civilian populations? Preliminary findings indicate that lack of political will and limited
mandates were the principal reasons for the failures of international organizations. These cases
provide a basis for recommendations and reforms within international institutions and underscore
the urgent need for measures that would reduce the likelihood of such genocides recurring.
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