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Political polarization and compromise in secession politics : theory note
ID Ramsay, Kristopher W. (Author), ID Prezelj, Iztok (Author)

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Abstract
Why do some secession movements lead to violent conflict, others are resolved through policy concessions, while still others end in peaceful separation? Existing theories focused on information asymmetries or commitment prob- lems cannot fully explain this variation in outcomes. We propose a bargaining theory of secession incorporat- ing three critical factors: policy polarization, credible exit, and resource rents. We demonstrate that secessions dif- fer from standard bargaining problems because successful separation creates two independent policy-setting enti- ties. Our analysis reveals that, even with complete information, policy differ ences alone can trigger conflict when polarization exceeds critical thresholds. Equally important, we identify conditions where peaceful partition becomes rational. The usefulness of this framework is demonstrated through comparative analysis of cases, including Su- dan, Czechoslovakia, and Panama. By explaining compromise, peaceful separation, and violent secession within a unified model, this research advances our theoretical understanding of when political unions endure or dissolve.

Language:English
Keywords:bargaining, polarization, contest
Work type:Article
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FDV - Faculty of Social Sciences
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Publication date:01.07.2026
Year:2026
Number of pages:Str. 1-10
Numbering:Vol. 70, iss. 3
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-184238 This link opens in a new window
UDC:32:329.273
ISSN on article:0020-8833
DOI:10.1093/isq/sqag025 This link opens in a new window
COBISS.SI-ID:283380483 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:02.07.2026
Views:80
Downloads:65
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:International studies quarterly
Publisher:Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press
ISSN:0020-8833
COBISS.SI-ID:25667328 This link opens in a new window

Licences

License:CC BY-NC 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Description:A creative commons license that bans commercial use, but the users don’t have to license their derivative works on the same terms.

Projects

Funder:ARIS
Project number:BI-US/18–19-047
Name:Secession Games: Application of Game Theory on Secession Situations in Contemporary States

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