Jürgen Habermas's conception of religion is based on the paradigm of communicative rationality. This doctoral dissertation examines the manner in which Habermas gradually develops a constructive attitude toward religion and strives to establish a productive dialogue with believers. In the initial and intermediate phases of his intellectual trajectory, Habermas took a reserved or even somewhat negative stance toward religion. The first part of the dissertation focuses predominantly on the analysis of works that belong to these two earlier phases of his intellectual development. The second part of the dissertation explores Habermas's third phase, which is characterized by his acknowledgment of the positive value of active dialogue with religion and the inclusion of believers in public discourse. Habermas contends that religion can become an important social interlocutor if it renounces fundamentalism and accepts the process of translating its specific concepts into universal communicative rationality. In this way, dialogue with religion can contribute to the defense of modern post-secular society against the dangers posed by postmodernity. In the last part of the dissertation, Habermas's relationship to religion is evaluated in light of his dialogue with Kierkegaard's existential thought. Although Kierkegaard's paradoxical understanding of faith seems at first glance to contradict Habermas's theory, there are significant opportunities for a productive dialogue between the two thinkers. In certain places, Kierkegaard might even be recognized as Habermas's potential ally. Particularly interesting parallels between the two thinkers can be found in their respective conceptions of religion.
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