Pravno-ekonomska analiza izvršbe

Reven, Rebeka (avtor), Cepec, Jaka (mentor), Zajc, Katarina (komentor)

Avtorica obravnava temeljno vprašanje v izvršbi, in sicer kako upniku zagotoviti čim učinkovitejše poplačilo dolga ob upoštevanju ustreznega varstva dolžnika. Avtorica ugotavlja, kje je meja med učinkovitostjo izvršbe in varstvom dolžnikovih pravic v izvršbi, pri čemer ima država ključno vlogo, saj mora zagotoviti učinkovit sistem izvršbe, hkrati pa dolžnikom omogočiti ustrezno varstvo. Iz zgodovinskega pregleda izhaja, da so se oblikovali trije pomembnejši mejniki glede tega, do česa ima upnik pravico v izvršbi: (1.) najprej je imel pravico do dolžnikovega telesa: da se dolžnika ubije, zasužnji ali proda; (2.) pozneje je imel pravico do neomejenega posega v dolžnikovo celotno premoženje; in (3.) nazadnje je imel pravico do zasega in prodaje posameznega dolžnikovega premoženja. Zaradi vzdrževanja reda je edino država pooblaščena za uporabo sile. Začetni položaj v izvršbi določa dolžnikova zavrnitev izpolnitve, izvršba pa pomeni uveljavitev pravne posledice z uporabo državne prisile ali grožnjo z uporabo državne prisile proti tistemu, ki te zavezujoče pravne posledice ne izpolni prostovoljno. Države morajo zagotoviti zakonski okvir, ki prizadetemu posamezniku omogoča, da učinkovito uveljavlja svoje pravice. V izvršilnem postopku ne more govoriti o enakem upoštevanju interesov upnika in dolžnika oziroma o njunem enakopravnem položaju. Seveda pa je v okviru zagotavljanja učinkovitosti izvršilnega postopka pomembno upoštevati dolžnika in mu zagotavljati ustrezno varstvo. Vprašanje je, katere so tiste procesne garancije, ki so nujne in jih je treba dolžniku zagotoviti. Dolžnikov položaj mora biti dovolj varovan, v smislu varstva pred neutemeljeno izvršbo in spoštovanja človekovega dostojanstva. Upnikova pravica do učinkovite izvršbe ne sme posegati v dolžnikov položaj tako, da bi bil ogrožen eksistenčni minimum dolžnika in tistih oseb, ki jih mora dolžnik preživljati. Avtorica ugotavlja, da je čezmerna zaščita vse, kar ni na spodnji meji ustavno dopustnega. Avtorica s pomočjo ekonomike blaginje preučuje učinkovitost izvršilnega sistema v smislu doseganja družbene blaginje. Če so pravna pravila izvršbe oblikovana tako, da povečajo skupno družbeno blaginjo, pomeni, da so skladna z ekonomskim konceptom učinkovitosti. Iz ciljev zakona izhaja, da mora izvršba pripeljati do poplačila upnika, biti stroškovno učinkovita in hitra. Hkrati pa mora zagotavljati osnovno varstvo dolžnika v izvršbi, ki ga predstavlja minimum dolžnikovih procesnih pravic, kot jih zagotavljajo konvencijska in ustavna pravila. Če se s pravnimi pravili zagotavlja čezmerno varstvo dolžnika, to vodi v izgubo družbene blaginje. Če ne pride do izpolnitve upnikovega zahtevka oziroma do nje pride z veliko zamudo, izvršba ni učinkovita. Avtorica domneva, da bi se ob pogojih popolnega trga upnik in dolžnik dogovorila, da mora dolžnik plačati, razen če upnik zahteva nekaj, kar ni dolgovano ali je že poravnano, ter ob upoštevanju dolžnikovega eksistencialnega minimuma. Za te primere mora imeti dolžnik pravico do procesnih jamstev. Varstvo dolžnika obsega predvsem (1.) varstvo dolžnikove eksistence in dostojanstva, ki se zagotavlja z oprostitvami in omejitvami izvršbe; možnostjo dolžnika, da predlaga omejitev izvršbe oziroma določitev drugega izvršilnega sredstva oziroma predmeta; in (2.) uresničevanje dolžnikovih procesnih jamstev (ugovor, pritožba, odlog). V primeru izvršbe na nepremičnino, ki je tudi dolžnikov dom, obstaja dodatno (procesno) varstvo dolžnika: sodišče lahko na predlog dolžnika ali po uradni dolžnosti odloži izvršbo, če so za to podani posebno upravičeni razlogi, sodišče pa mora opozoriti dolžnika o možnosti odloga in o tem, da je v primeru izvršbe na nepremičnino odlog mogoč do izdaje odredbe o prodaji. Slovenska ureditev nalaga državi dodatne naloge, ko mora preverjati določene stvari po uradni dolžnosti, kar v primerljivih sistemih ni praksa. To ne pomeni, da sistem izvršbe čezmerno ščiti dolžnika, ampak le to, da so dolžnosti, ki bi jih sicer imel dolžnik, v slovenskem pravnem sistemu v določenih primerih preložene na državo. Predvsem je to opazno, kadar gre za bagatelen dolg in izvršbo na nepremičnino, ki je dolžnikov dom. Ob čezmernem varstvu dolžnika se družbena blaginja zmanjša oziroma izvršba ni več na pogodbeni krivulji. Pravna pravila so zunaj pogodbene krivulje in niso učinkovita. S tem, ko bi naložili dolžniku aktivno ravnanje, nikakor ne bi zmanjšali njegovega procesnega varstva, ki mu pripada. Cilj slovenskega zakonodajalca je torej zagotoviti hitro poplačilo upnika, vendar povečuje varstvo dolžnika, predvsem v smislu razbremenitve dolžnika, ki mu ni več treba aktivno ravnati. Avtorica meni, da se zaradi večje količine procesnih pravic, vsaj na teoretični ravni, pozneje dosega namen zakona, ki je v hitrem poplačilu upnika. V empirični analizi se avtorica osredini na vprašanje, katere spremenljivke vplivajo na trajanje izvršilnega postopka in predvsem kako vpliva možnost uveljavljanja velikega števila procesnih jamstev dolžnika na trajanje izvršilnega postopka. V okviru empiričnega raziskovanja ugotovi, da nepremičninska izvršba v primerjavi s civilno in gospodarsko traja najdlje, prav tako pa tudi, da je v nepremičninski izvršbi v povprečju uporabljenih največ pravnih sredstev. Avtorica preverja, ali na daljše trajanje nepremičninske izvršbe med drugim vplivajo dolžnikove aktivnosti. Ugotovi, da število procesnih dejanj pravzaprav ni povezano s trajanjem postopka, povezava je sicer seveda pozitivno korelirana, ampak zelo majhna.

• Jezik: Slovenski jezik
• Ključne besede: izvršba, namen izvršbe, izpolnitev upnikovega zahtevka, varstvo dolžnika, ekonomika blaginje, učinkovitost v izvršbi, nepremičninska izvršba, trajanje izvršbe, procesna jamstva
• Vrsta gradiva: Doktorsko delo/naloga
• Organizacija: PF - Pravna fakulteta
• Leto izida: 2022
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-137159
• COBISS.SI-ID: 115861763
• Datum objave v RUL: 03.06.2022

Sekundarni jezik

• Jezik: Angleški jezik
• Naslov: Law and economics of enforcement proceedings

Izvleček

The goal of enforcement procedure is to ensure the redemption of the creditor’s claims while the debtor’s protection merely constitutes a restriction of enforcement procedure. The author determines the boundary between the efficiency of the enforcement and the protection of the debtor’s rights. The state plays a key role, as it must ensure an effective enforcement system while providing adequate protection for the debtors. The review of historical development reveals the formation of three major milestones within the creditor’s entitlement in enforcement: the creditor was entitled (1) to claim the debtor’s body: to enslave and sell, and in certain circumstances even kill the debtor; (2) to seize the debtor’s entire property; and (3) to seize and sale the individual debtor’s assets. To maintain order, only the state is authorised to use force. The starting point of each enforcement procedure is determined by the debtor’s refusal to redeem the creditor’s claim. Therefore, enforcement procedure substitutes the debtor’s discretion to fulfil a legal obligation by exercising state coercion. To justify this exclusion of the application of force by individuals, the state is obliged to provide a legal framework to effectively enable those individuals to enforce their right. Consequently, it is indisputable that an equal consideration of creditor’s and debtor’s interests in the enforcement procedure is not possible. They are not the opposite sides of a balanced scale. Nevertheless, it is important to take the debtor into account and afford her some protection. However, the issue is which are the necessary procedural guarantees that must be provided to the debtor. The debtor’s position must be adequately protected, in terms of protection against unjustified enforcement and respect for human dignity. The creditor’s right to effective enforcement must not interfere with the debtor’s position in a way to jeopardise the debtor’s minimum subsistence (and his dependents). The author concludes that excessive protection is everything that is above the lower limit of the constitutionally permissible. Applying findings of welfare economics, the author examines the effectiveness of the enforcement procedure in terms of achieving social welfare. If the enforcement procedure rules are designed in a way to increase the overall social welfare, they are efficient. Enforcement procedure must lead to the repayment of the creditor, be cost-effective and prompt. Simultaneously, it must provide the basic protection to the debtor—ensuring the minimum of the debtor’s procedural rights as guaranteed by the Convention and constitutional rules. Insofar as the legal framework causes excessive protection of the debtor, it leads to a loss of social welfare. If there is no fulfilment of the creditor’s claim or there is fulfilment with an excessive delay, the enforcement procedure becomes ineffective. The author assumes that in perfect competition the creditor and the debtor would agree that the debtor must pay, unless the creditor demands something not owed or has already been settled, taking into account the debtor’s minimum subsistence. In these cases, the debtor must be entitled to procedural guarantees. The protection of the debtor includes in particular (1) the protection of the debtor’s existence and dignity that is ensured by exemptions and restrictions on enforcement, e.g. the possibility of the debtor to propose a restriction on enforcement or determination of another means of enforcement or items and (2) the exercise of debtor’s procedural guarantees (objection, appeal, postponement). In the case of enforcement in real estate—which is also the debtor’s home—additional (procedural) protection of the debtor exists: the court may—at the request of the debtor or ex officio—postpone enforcement if there are specifically justified reasons, and the court must warn the debtor that in the case of execution on the real estate, deferment is possible until the issuance of a sale order. The debtor must also be informed of the possibility of submitting a motion for enforcement on other assets or on other immovable property. The Slovenian regulation imposes additional tasks on the state to do certain things ex officio, which is not the practice in comparable systems. This does not mean that the Slovenian enforcement regulation excessively protects the debtor, but only that the duties the debtor would otherwise have are in certain cases transferred to the state. This is especially notable when it comes to small debt and enforcement procedure of real estate that is the debtor’s home. With excessive protection of the debtor, social welfare is reduced and enforcement rules are no longer on the contract curve, meaning they are not efficient. Imposing active performance on the debtor would in no way reduce her procedural protection. The aim of the Slovenian legislator is to ensure a prompt repayment of the creditor, but it increases the protection of the debtor, especially in terms of relieving the debtor, who no longer has to act proactively. The author assumes that due to the larger amount of procedural rights, at least on a theoretical level, the purpose of the enforcement—repayment of the creditor’s claim—is achieved at a later stage. In the empirical analysis, the author examined how the possibility of enforcing a large number of procedural guarantees of the debtor affects the duration of enforcement proceedings. In the framework of empirical research, it was concluded that real estate enforcement takes the longest time compared to civil and commercial enforcement, as well as that in real estate enforcement the most legal remedies are used on average. The author investigated whether the longer duration of real estate enforcement is affected by certain debtor’s activities. It was assessed that the number of procedural actions negligently affect the duration of the procedure, and that the association is slightly positively correlated.

• Ključne besede: enforcement procedure, repayment of creditor, protection of debtor, welfare economics, efficiency of enforcement procedure, real estate enforcement procedure, duration of enforcement procedure, procedural guarantees