It is assumed that electronic systems should securely store private data. If algorithm designers, hardware engineers and software developers do not cooperate and understand each others’ work, security assumptions made in one layer of a system may not match the actual properties of other layers. This can result in information leakage trough the side-channels. Examples of side-channels are operation execution timing, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, thermal and acoustic emanations.
Side-channels may be used for breaking cryptographic systems with no known weaknesses in the mathematical structure of the algorithm, unlike traditional cryptanalytic methods, such as linear and differential cryptanalysis. Relatively cheap an easily obtained measurement equipment is usually enough for doing many of these attacks making them a significant concern when selecting an algorithm and designing its implementation.
This thesis will research the potential existence of a side-channel in a BA20 processor designed by Beyond Semiconductor. Side-channel analysis will be done using the DPA and CPA power analysis methods. These two methods will be verified first using a simple RTL model and later a synthesized version of this model. Processor BA20 will be synthesized for the analysis. Synthesis will be done in a 65-nm CMOS technology. Possible solutions for protection from side-channel leakages will be analysed and the optimal one suggested in the case of a BA20 processor.
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