This master’s thesis examines the methods of interpretation in criminal law and their significance for the correct, foreseeable, and principled application of criminal law provisions. The research is based on the premise that criminal law, due to its repressive nature and its far-reaching interference with fundamental human rights and freedoms, requires a particularly strict methodological approach to the interpretation of legal norms. The thesis analyses the classical methods of legal interpretation, in particular linguistic, logical, systematic, historical, and teleological interpretation, and explores their specific role within the field of criminal law.
The central finding of the thesis is that criminal law does not provide a predetermined meta-rule that would hierarchically or conclusively govern the choice of interpretative method. Although interpretation should generally begin with the linguistic meaning of the legal text, the proper meaning of a criminal law norm must also be established through the use of other interpretative methods. However, such interpretation must always remain within the limits imposed by the principle of legality.
On the basis of an analysis of legal theory and selected judicial decisions, the thesis concludes that the principle of legality constitutes the fundamental framework for the interpretation of criminal law. Methods of interpretation should therefore not be understood merely as technical legal instruments, but as an essential safeguard of legal certainty, human rights, and the rule of law.
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