The purpose of this article is to present the critical evaluation of George Tyrrell’s postulate concerning the knowledge of God by experience. The postulate was born from the criticism directed towards the way of conceiving the knowledge of God in Neo-Scholasticism – the way that only took into consideration the intellectual dimension. To achieve this goal, the first step was to in-dicate when and why the Irish theologian passed from one who followed neo- -scholastic positions to one who severely criticized “scholasticism”. In the second part of the article, Tyrrell’s way of understanding the notion of religious experience is specified, that is, of understanding it as a revelation of God in its primordial aspect. As a third point, it is presented how Tyrrell himself tried to respond to the greatest problem of his conception of religious experience, namely that of the relationship between the objective and subjective dimensions of truth in religious experience. The last part of the article presents both the negative evaluation by the Magisterium during the modernist controversy of Tyrrell’s postulate, and the perspective opened up by the Second Vatican Council which allowsfor a positive evaluation of the postulate itself, without giving in to errors present in Tyrrell’s conceptionNamen članka je predstaviti kritično oceno postulata Georgea Tyrrella o spoznanju Boga na podlagi izkušnje. Postulat se je rodil iz kritike, usmerjene proti načinu pojmovanja spoznanja Boga v neosholastiki – načinu, ki je upošteval le intelektualno razsežnost. Za dosego tega cilja je bilo treba najprej nakazati, kdaj in zakaj je irski teolog prešel od sledenja neosholastičnim stališčem k ostri kritiki ‚sholastike‘. V drugem delu članka je opredeljen Tyrrellov način razumevanja pojma religioznega izkustva, tj. razumevanje tega izkustva kot razodetja Boga v njegovem prvobitnem vidiku. V tretjem delu je predstavljeno, kako je Tyrrellsam poskušal odgovoriti na največji problem svojega pojmovanja religioznega izkustva, namreč na vprašanje razmerja med objektivno in subjektivno razsežnostjo resnice v religioznem izkustvu. V zadnjem delu članka je predstavljena tako negativna ocena Tyrrellovega postulata, ki jo v času modernizma podalo učiteljstvo, kot tudi perspektiva, ki jo je odprl drugi vatikanski koncil in ki omogoča pozitivno oceno samega postulata, ne da bi pri tem popuščal napakam, prisotnim v Tyrrellovem pojmovanju.
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