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Mehanizmi za zagotavljanje varnosti sistema domenskih imen
ID Muhamedagić, Ajla (Author), ID Kos, Andrej (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window

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Abstract
Sistem domenskih imen je ena izmed temeljnih storitev interneta, vendar njegova zasnova ne zagotavlja kriptografskega preverjanja avtentičnosti in integritete podatkov DNS niti zaupnosti poizvedb. Zaradi tega je DNS izpostavljen različnim varnostnim tveganjem, med katerimi so ponarejanje odgovorov, zastrupljanje predpomnilnika, prestrezanje in spreminjanje prometa ter refleksijsko-amplifikacijski napadi. V diplomski nalogi so obravnavani varnostni mehanizmi DNSSEC, DNS-over-TLS in DNS-over-HTTPS ter njihova vloga pri zagotavljanju varnosti sistema DNS. Praktični del je bil izveden v dveh dopolnjujočih se preizkusnih scenarijih. V nadzorovanem okolju Oracle VirtualBox sta bila vzpostavljena avtoritativni strežnik BIND9 in odjemalski sistem Kali Linux. Implementirani so bili samodejno podpisovanje cone z DNSSEC, validacija z lokalnim sidrom zaupanja, DoT z uporabo posrednika NGINX ter DoH z uporabo programske opreme dnsdist. Delovanje rešitev je bilo preverjeno s funkcionalnimi testi, negativnim testom DNSSEC in analizo omrežnega prometa v programu Wireshark. Eksperiment je bil dopolnjen z meritvami dejanske internetne povezave do javnega rekurzivnega razreševalnika. Za DNS/UDP, DNS/TCP, DoT in DoH je bilo izvedenih 100 meritev z istim odjemalskim orodjem. Povprečni odzivni časi so znašali 29,8 ms za DNS/UDP, 41,6 ms za DNS/TCP, 250,9 ms za DoT in 251,1 ms za DoH. Pri DoT in DoH je bila za vsako poizvedbo vzpostavljena nova šifrirana povezava, zato rezultati vključujejo tudi strošek vzpostavljanja seje TCP/TLS oziroma seje HTTPS in jih ni mogoče enačiti z delovanjem dolgotrajnih povezav. Praktični testi so potrdili, da DNSSEC ter DoT in DoH rešujejo različne varnostne težave. DNSSEC omogoča preverjanje avtentičnosti izvora in integritete podatkov DNS, vendar ne zagotavlja zaupnosti poizvedb. Po drugi strani DoT in DoH šifrirata komunikacijski kanal med odjemalcem in razreševalnikom, pri čemer sama po sebi ne zagotavljata validacije podatkov DNS. Za celovitejšo zaščito sistema DNS je zato smiselna kombinacija kriptografske validacije, šifriranega transporta in dodatnih operativnih mehanizmov.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:DNS, DNSSEC, DNS preko TLS, DNS preko HTTPS, varnost DNS, DoT, DoH, zasebnost DNS, ECH
Work type:Bachelor thesis/paper
Typology:2.11 - Undergraduate Thesis
Organization:FE - Faculty of Electrical Engineering
Year:2026
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-187170 This link opens in a new window
COBISS.SI-ID:291156483 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:09.09.2026
Views:232
Downloads:90
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Security Mechanisms for Domain Name System
Abstract:
The Domain Name System is one of the fundamental services of the Internet, but its original design does not support cryptographic verification of the authenticity and integrity of DNS data, nor does it provide confidentiality of DNS queries. Consequently, DNS is exposed to various security risks, including response spoofing, cache poisoning, traffic interception and modification, and reflection-amplification attacks. This thesis examines the security mechanisms DNSSEC, DNS-over-TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS, as well as their roles in securing the DNS. The practical part was conducted using two complementary test scenarios. A BIND9 authoritative server and a Kali Linux client system were set up within a controlled Oracle VirtualBox environment. Implementations included automatic zone signing with DNSSEC, validation using a local trust anchor, DoT via an NGINX proxy, and DoH using dnsdist software. The solutions were verified through functional tests, a negative DNSSEC test, and network traffic analysis using Wireshark. The experiment was supplemented by measurements taken over an actual Internet connection to a public recursive resolver. One hundred measurements were performed for each protocol (DNS/UDP, DNS/TCP, DoT and DoH) using the same client tool. The average response times were 29.8 ms for DNS/UDP, 41.6 ms for DNS/TCP, 250.9 ms for DoT, and 251.1 ms for DoH. With DoT and DoH, a new encrypted connection was established for each query. Consequently, the results include the overhead of establishing the TCP/TLS or HTTPS session and cannot be equated to the performance of long-lived connections. Practical tests have confirmed that DNSSEC, DoT and DoH address different security issues. DNSSEC enables the verification of origin authenticity and data integrity for DNS but does not ensure query confidentiality. In contrast, DoT and DoH encrypt the communication channel between the client and the resolver, though they do not inherently provide DNS data validation. Therefore, a combination of cryptographic validation, encrypted transport, and additional operational mechanisms is advisable for more comprehensive DNS system protection.

Keywords:DNS, DNSSEC, DNS-over-TLS, DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS security, DoT, DoH, DNS privacy, ECH

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