Prispevek Sveta EU k demokratičnemu deficitu rednega zakonodajnega postopka : diplomsko delo

Glažar, David (author), Nikolić, Bruno (mentor), Umek, Lan (comentor)

Evropska unija se sooča z demokratičnim deficitom, pri čemer je vloga Sveta Evropske unije v literaturi razmeroma slabo raziskana, čeprav je enakopraven sozakonodajalec v rednem zakonodajnem postopku. Namen dela je bil ugotoviti, ali Svet demokratični deficit povzroča in/ali ga odraža, presoditi pravičnost obstoječega sistema glasovanja v Svetu ter predlagati morebitne izboljšave. V teoretičnem delu smo z deskriptivno metodo, sintezo in komparativno metodo predstavili institucionalno ureditev EU, redni zakonodajni postopek ter vlogo Sveta, ki smo jo primerjali s sorodnimi institucijami (ameriški Senat, švicarski Ständerat, nemški Bundesrat). V analitičnem delu smo s pomočjo indeksa Shapley–Shubik in aproksimacije Monte Carla matematično analizirali pravičnost različnih sistemov glasovanja, rezultate preverili s primerjavo z obstoječimi objavami, delovanje pa simulirali na podlagi volitev v Evropski parlament leta 2024. Ugotovili smo, da Svet izpolnjuje merila za povzročanje demokratičnega deficita, saj deluje netransparentno in ni neposredno demokratično odgovoren, hkrati pa v določeni meri odraža širše strukturne pomanjkljivosti EU. Ugotovili smo tudi, da obstoječi sistem kvalificirane večine nesorazmerno koristi večjim državam članicam, zato kot pravičnejšo alternativo predlagamo Svet z neposredno izvoljenimi predstavniki ter uporabo navadne večine. Delo prispeva h kvantitativnemu razumevanju glasovalne moči v Svetu in ponuja metodološki okvir, uporaben tudi za analizo drugih institucij večnivojskih sistemov. Rezultati so lahko izhodišče za razprave o institucionalni reformi EU. Omejitve dela izhajajo iz normativne narave predloga, ki ne upošteva politične izvedljivosti, ter iz predpostavke enotnega nacionalnega glasovanja evroparlamentarcev.

• Language: Slovenian
• Keywords: demokratični deficit, Svet Evropske unije, redni zakonodajni postopek, indeks Shapley–Shubik, kvalificirana večina, glasovalna moč
• Work type: Bachelor thesis/paper
• Typology: 2.11 - Undergraduate Thesis
• Organization: FU - Faculty of Administration
• Place of publishing: Ljubljana
• Publisher: [D. Glažar]
• Year: 2026
• Number of pages: XI, 74 str.
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-185872
• UDC: 341.1:061.1EU(043.2)
• COBISS.SI-ID: 288492035
• Publication date in RUL: 21.08.2026

Secondary language

• Language: English
• Title: The EU Council's contribution to the democratic deficit of the ordinary legislative procedure

Abstract

The European Union faces a democratic deficit, within which the role of the Council of the European Union remains comparatively under-researched in the literature, despite its status as an equal co-legislator in the ordinary legislative procedure. The purpose of the thesis was to determine whether the Council causes and/or reflects the democratic deficit, to assess the fairness of the Council's existing voting system, and to propose possible improvements. In the theoretical part, the descriptive method, synthesis, and the comparative method were used to present the EU's institutional structure, the ordinary legislative procedure, and the role of the Council, which was compared with related institutions (the US Senate, the Swiss Ständerat, the German Bundesrat). In the analytical part, the fairness of different voting systems was mathematically analysed using the Shapley–Shubik index and Monte Carlo approximation, the results were verified by comparison with existing publications, and the model's operation was simulated based on the 2024 European Parliament election results. It was found that the Council meets the criteria for causing the democratic deficit, as it operates non-transparently and is not directly democratically accountable, while also, to a certain extent, reflecting the EU's broader structural shortcomings. It was further found that the existing qualified majority system disproportionately benefits larger member states; as a fairer alternative, a Council composed of directly elected representatives operating by simple majority is proposed. The thesis contributes to the quantitative understanding of voting power in the Council and offers a methodological framework also applicable to the analysis of other institutions within multi-level systems. The results may serve as a starting point for discussions on EU institutional reform. The limitations of the thesis stem from the normative nature of the proposal, which does not take political feasibility into account, and from the assumption of uniform national-bloc voting by MEPs.

• Keywords: democratic deficit, Council of the European Union, ordinary legislative procedure, Shapley–Shubik index, qualified majority, voting power