This master's thesis examines whether the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in the field of international human rights law ever goes beyond interpretation and contributes to the development of law through judicial law-making. The argumentation is based on the premise that the International Court of Justice was established to adjudicate disputes between States and to render advisory opinions, yet through its work it also affects individuals as holders of human rights whose international legal personality is only partially recognized. Individuals, in particular, do not have access to the International Court of Justice to seek protection of their rights. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the International Court of Justice in the field of human rights sometimes goes beyond the boundaries of interpretation de lege lata becomes a co-creator of law de lege ferenda, particularly through interpretation of existing sources of law, systemic integration of different areas of law, consideration of the practice of other bodies, and authoritative resolution of legal questions. Such activity of the Court contributes to the formation and consolidation of legal standards whose content had not previously been clearly or generally accepted. However, this cannot be understood as judicial law-making in itself. The creative role of the International Court of Justice is primarily manifested through its interpretative function, through which it contributes to the development of international human rights law. The analysis demonstrates that international human rights law is no longer limited solely to the work of specialised human rights bodies and institutions. The International Court of Justice has addressed significant questions in this field and thereby contributed to its development.
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