Beyond ethnic outbidding : electoral design and strategic adaptations in Iraqi Kurdistan

Tarkhani, Soran (author)

This study investigates how electoral system design shapes intra- ethnic competition, focusing on Iraqi Kurdistan from 1992 to 2013. Challenging Horowitz’s outbidding model, which assumes that ethnic parties escalate demands to outcompete rivals, this research demonstrates that electoral rules—including thresholds, ballot structures, and district demographics—mediate party strategies. Through mixed-methods analysis of elections, party platforms, and campaign materials, the findings reveal that high thresholds incentivize coalition-building, while their absence enables narrower appeals. Similarly, heterogeneous districts encourage inclusive strategies targeting diverse electorates, while homogeneous districts promote exclusivist appeals. The study concludes with actionable recommendations for electoral system design to balance inclusivity, stability, and representation in divided societies.

• Language: English
• Keywords: intra-ethnic competition, thresholds, ballot structures, Kurdish politics, ethnic party strategies
• Work type: Article
• Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
• Geographic coverage: Kurdistan (Irak)
• Organization: FDV - Faculty of Social Sciences
• Publication status: Published
• Publication version: Version of Record
• Year: 2025
• Number of pages: Str. 52-68
• Numbering: Vol. 18, no. 2
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-179337
• UDC: 324(567)
• ISSN on article: 1338-1385
• COBISS.SI-ID: 267941379
• Publication date in RUL: 11.02.2026

Record is a part of a journal

• Title: Journal of comparative politics
• Publisher: Department of Political Science, Center for Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions, Alma Mater Europea-European Centre Maribor (AMEU-ECM)
• ISSN: 1338-1385
• COBISS.SI-ID: 29224285

Licences

• License: CC BY-SA 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
• Link: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
• Description: This Creative Commons license is very similar to the regular Attribution license, but requires the release of all derivative works under this same license.

Secondary language

• Language: Slovenian
• Title: Onkraj etničnega preseganja

Abstract

Članek analizira vpliv zasnove volilnega sistema na znotrajetnično politično konkurenco, s posebnim poudarkom na primeru iraškega Kurdistana v obdobju 1992–2013. Študija izpodbija Horowitzov model »draženja«, ki predpostavlja, da etnične stranke stopnjujejo svoje zahteve z namenom prehiteti etnične tekmece. Nasprotno avtor ugotavlja, da so strategije političnih strank v večji meri oblikovane z volilnimi pravili – vključno z volilnimi pragovi, strukturo glasovnic in demografskimi značilnostmi volilnih okrožij. Z uporabo mešanih metod, ki vključujejo analizo volilnih rezultatov, programov političnih strank in kampanjskih gradiv, študija pokaže, da visoki volilni prag spodbuja oblikovanje predvolilnih koalicij, medtem ko njegova odsotnost omogoča polarizirane in partikularne nagovore volilcev. Podobno heterogena volilna okrožja spodbujajo vključujoče, široko usmerjene kampanje, medtem ko homogena okrožja krepijo ekskluzivistične, etnično usmerjene strategije. Študija se zaključi s praktičnimi priporočili za oblikovanje volilnih sistemov, ki naj bi v razdeljenih družbah uravnotežili cilje politične vključenosti, stabilnosti in reprezentativnosti.

• Keywords: volilni sistem, politične stranke, Kurdistan (Irak)