Cognitive science, the explanatory gap and Kripke against the mind-brain identity theory

Malec, Maja (author), Markič, Olga (author)

Cognitive science, by its inherently interdisciplinary nature, faces the challenge of integration. This paper outlines the challenge and provides a short history of the proposed solutions. Yet another challenge comes from philosophers who believe that the mind is radically different from the body (the mind-body problem), often identifying consciousness as the most recalcitrant aspect of the mind (the problem of consciousness). We begin by examining Saul Kripke’s argument against the possibility of identifying mental states with physical states, as proposed in the mind-brain identity theory, and argue that it is not decisive. We then discuss the difficulty of investigating and explaining subjective experience with the standard scientific methods and conclude with two contemporary approaches that aim to bridge this explanatory gap.

• Language: English
• Keywords: philosophy, cognitive science, consciousness, mind-brain identity, explanatory gap, Saul A. Kripke
• Work type: Article
• Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
• Organization: FF - Faculty of Arts
• Publication status: Published
• Publication version: Version of Record
• Year: 2025
• Number of pages: Str. 107-123
• Numbering: Letn. 19, št. 1
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-178680
• UDC: 001:165.194
• ISSN on article: 1854-9632
• DOI: 10.4312/ars.19.1.107-123
• COBISS.SI-ID: 246342147
• Publication date in RUL: 05.03.2026

Record is a part of a journal

• Title: Ars & humanitas : revija za umetnost in humanistiko
• Publisher: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete, Založba Univerze v Ljubljani
• ISSN: 1854-9632
• COBISS.SI-ID: 233246720

Licences

• License: CC BY-SA 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
• Link: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
• Description: This Creative Commons license is very similar to the regular Attribution license, but requires the release of all derivative works under this same license.

Secondary language

• Language: Slovenian
• Title: Kognitivna znanost, razlagalna vrzel in Kripke proti teoriji identitete med duhom in možgani

Abstract

Kognitivna znanost se zaradi svoje izrazito interdisciplinarne narave sooča z integracijskim izzivom. Prispevek oriše ta izziv in poda kratek zgodovinski pregled predlaganih rešitev. Dodaten izziv zastavljajo filozofi, ki menijo, da je duh radikalno drugačen od telesa (problem duha in telesa), pri čemer pogosto izpostavljajo zavest kot najtežavnejši vidik duha (problem zavesti). Najprej obravnavava argument Saula Kripkeja proti možnosti identifikacije duševnih stanj s fizičnimi stanji, kot jo predlaga teorija identitete duha in možganov, ter trdiva, da ta argument ni odločilen. Nato razpravljava o težavah pri raziskovanju in razlagi subjektivnega izkustva s standardnimi znanstvenimi metodami ter zaključiva z dvema sodobnima pristopoma, ki si prizadevata premostiti to zaskrbljujočo razlagalno vrzel.

• Keywords: filozofija, kognitivna znanost, zavest, identiteta duha in možganov, razlagalna vrzel, Saul A. Kripke

Projects

• Funder: ARIS - Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency
• Project number: P6-0252
• Name: Filozofske raziskave

• Funder: ARIS - Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency
• Project number: J6-50211
• Name: Budizem v himalajskih puščavah: tradicija jogijev in jogini v Ladakhu