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Endogenous regulation of selection pressure : a minimal game-theoretical model
ID
Gašperov, Bruno
(
Author
),
ID
Šter, Branko
(
Author
)
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https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030326472500276X
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Abstract
Selection pressure, determining which individuals survive and reproduce, is traditionally regarded as an exogenous property of the environment. However, growing evidence from the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) suggests that the strength of selection can, to some extent, be modulated by the organisms themselves. In this paper, we propose a minimal game-theoretical model that formalizes the concept of endogenous selection pressure. In the model, individuals collectively determine the intensity of selection through their actions: each agent ‘‘votes’’ to either intensify or relax selection depending on its relative fitness rank. The aggregate outcome of these decisions defines the number of reproducers, k, which is inversely related to the overall strength of selection. We analytically derive all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game and examine their properties. By internalizing selection as a population-level emergent variable, the framework provides a tractable formalization of key principles from the EES and offers a foundation for exploring evolutionary dynamics that arise under the presence of endogenous selection pressure.
Language:
English
Keywords:
selection pressure
,
game theory
,
extended evolutionary synthesis
,
self-adaptation
Work type:
Article
Typology:
1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:
FRI - Faculty of Computer and Information Science
Publication status:
Published
Publication version:
Version of Record
Year:
2026
Number of pages:
7 str.
Numbering:
Vol. 259, art. 105666
PID:
20.500.12556/RUL-177410
UDC:
004
ISSN on article:
0303-2647
DOI:
10.1016/j.biosystems.2025.105666
COBISS.SI-ID:
262193923
Publication date in RUL:
23.12.2025
Views:
464
Downloads:
299
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Record is a part of a journal
Title:
Biosystems
Shortened title:
Biosystems
Publisher:
Elsevier
ISSN:
0303-2647
COBISS.SI-ID:
25103360
Licences
License:
CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:
This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Secondary language
Language:
Slovenian
Keywords:
selekcijski pritisk
,
teorija iger
,
razširjena evolucijska sinteza
,
samoadaptacija
Projects
Funder:
EC - European Commission
Funding programme:
HE
Project number:
101081355
Name:
Machine learning for Sciences and Humanities
Acronym:
SMASH
Funder:
ARIS - Slovenian Research and Innovation Agency
Project number:
P2-0241
Name:
Sinergetika kompleksnih sistemov in procesov
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