After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran, due to the relative non-competitiveness of its conventional military forces, focused on developing asymmetric warfare as its central defence concept against external threats such as Israel, the influence of Western countries, and Saudi Arabia. Iran, especially after the Iraq War (2003) and the Arab Spring (2011), took advantage of the unstable security situation in the Middle East and, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), intensified its activities in the region. The IRGC systematically strengthened its ideological, financial, and military support primarily for marginalized Shiite insurgent groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain. Among these groups, the IRGC promoted the spread of the ideology of the Islamic Revolution and the concept of the rule of the Islamic jurist (»Velayat-e Faqih«). It also supported Sunni Palestinian militias as well as the (now former) Syrian regime. By backing these state and non-state actors, Iran established proxy relationships through which it effectively advances its interests without becoming directly involved in the conflict. This allows it to avoid political responsibility and the high costs of outright war. For Iran, proxies represent an important part of its deterrence strategy, as they create strategic defense depth on multiple fronts. Through these proxies, Iran has managed to expand its influence in the region and thus affect the balance of power in the Middle East.
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