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Mišljenje kot dejavnost : magistrsko delo
ID Pušnik, Matija (Author), ID Cerkovnik, Borut (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window

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Abstract
V nalogi razvijam argument, da so mišljenjska dejanja le dejanja med dejanji, ki so izvorno spontana in se agentu kažejo kot pojav. Jedrne argumente poznega Wittgensteina, predvsem obravnavo pravila, življenjske oblike in zasebnega jezika, razširim z uporabo pojmov s področij biosemiotike, fenomenologije in pragmatizma. Posamično misel (in dejanje sploh) umestim v agentov okolni svet, ki ga obravnavam kot polje oprijemališč, tj. dispozicij za delovanje. Na ta način pokažem, da se pravilo agentu kaže kot objektiven del sveta, čeprav po drugi strani izvira iz agentove življenjske oblike, ki ni le biološko, pač pa tudi (in pri nekaterih agentih predvsem) družbeno posredovana in ima, posledično, svojo zgodovino. Zaključim z Wittgensteinovo ugotovitvijo, da kakršnakoli življenjska oblika vseskozi proizvaja navskrižja in probleme, da pa preglednost in antropologizacija teh procesov ne vodi v relativizem, pač pa pokaže potrebo po sprotnem odpiranju novih problemskih polj.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:Wittgenstein, biosemiotika, pragmatizem, okolni svet, filozofija duha, kognitivna antropologija
Work type:Master's thesis/paper
Typology:2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:FF - Faculty of Arts
Place of publishing:Ljubljana
Publisher:M. Pušnik
Year:2025
Number of pages:73 str.
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-173679 This link opens in a new window
UDC:165.74:159.955(043.2)
COBISS.SI-ID:252045571 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:20.09.2025
Views:813
Downloads:220
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Thinking as Action
Abstract:
In this thesis I argue that thinking acts are equal to any other action, that they are essentially spontaneous, and that they appear to the agent as a phenomenon. I expand on the core arguments of late Wittgenstein, in particular his analysis of rule-following, life forms, and private language argument, with concepts from biosemiotics, phenomenology, and pragmatism. I locate individual thoughts (and acts in general) within the agent’s Umwelt, which I interpret as a field of affordances, i.e. dispositions for action. I show how a rule appears, to an agent, as an objective part of his world, despite originating in his life form, which is not only biological, but rather also (and with some agents, mostly) socially mediated, and, thus, has its own history. To conclude, I explain how all life forms remain subject to change and development, but also how the anthropologisation of thought does not lead to relativism, rather showing the need for ongoing opening of new problem areas.

Keywords:Wittgenstein, biosemiotics, pragmatism, Umwelt, philosophy of mind, cognitive anthropology

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