This Master’s thesis uses the example of the European Monetary Union to analyse how integration processes and formation of supranational institutions affect the relationship between sovereignty and democracy in member states. The European debt crisis between 2009 and 2015 revealed structural weaknesses in the European Monetary Union, which led to democratic deficit. The analysis is based on Rodrik's globalisation trilemma, which emphasizes that deep economic integration, national sovereignty and democratic governance are systemically incompatible in the long run; sooner or later, there will be a shift from one of the three corners of this globalisation triangle. The Master’s thesis demonstrates that efforts to simultaneously preserve national sovereignty and economic integration lead to lower democratic influence of citizens on economic and political decisions. Greece had to sacrifice part of its sovereignty and democracy in order to remain in the European Monetary Union, which did not happen in more powerful states like Germany. It shows that Rodrik's trilemma is a useful but loose analytical framework – the key is which powers are transferred to the supranational level, how the institutions are designed, and who controls them. The Master’s thesis contributes to the understanding of regional integration as a politically asymmetrical process where democracy and sovereignty often depend on the economic power of individual member states.
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