The master's thesis focuses on the issues surrounding the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into legal decision-making and the capability of such technology to interpret the law. AI can be introduced into legal decision-making in various ways; in this context, the concept of the "human in the loop" is presented. The "loop" consists of both a human and a technological component, each assuming specific roles in the decision-making process, which are outlined in selected sections of the thesis.
The thesis also addresses artificial intelligence from a technical perspective, particularly within the scope and depth deemed relevant to legal science. Due to its operational mechanisms, AI does not engage in (para)cognitive processes in the same manner as a human lawyer when interpreting the law. Consequently, established methods of legal interpretation, as recognized in legal theory and judicial practice, fall outside the functional capacity of AI—an argument substantiated in the central part of the thesis. Moreover, I argue that AI is inherently incapable of forming will. This position, supported by a comparative legal analysis, represents a fundamental obstacle to the deployment of AI in legal decision making.
The thesis further examines European legislation and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, with particular emphasis on the right to explanation as derived from the interpretation of the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
|
