Determining insanity in criminal proceedings follows a long-established method. The adoption of the Criminal Code (KZ-1) in 2008 somewhat changed the biological criterion for insanity. After more than a decade, I am reopening the question of the appropriateness of such a redaction, as personality disorders have essentially been omitted from the criteria.
Personality and behaviour disorders can be so ingrained in an individual that acting contrary to them is practically impossible. In doing so, we are demanding the impossible from such individuals, and the law does not allow them to be acquitted if, in a given case, they were not capable of acting differently, just like the mentally ill.
Through theoretical and empirical analysis, the master's thesis investigates whether it is expedient to expand the biological criterion of insanity and to include personality disorders such as other e.g. neurological diseases. The procedural part of the work is focused on the work of experts and the far-reaching nature of their work for the defendants in the criminal proceedings. The problematic nature of judges’ reliance on the work of experts and the most common errors in expert opinions are also presented from a practical point of view. Finally, the thesis focuses on the dynamics between the determination of insanity and the defendant's capacity to stand trial in the same criminal procedure.
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