Belief in God and affective states : a free-will response to the hiddenness argument

Dobrzeniecki, Marek (author)

The paper offers a new version of a free-will defence to Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument. Previous defences were accused of absolutizing human freedom and not showing how a cognitive state concerning divine existence could limit the moral freedom of people. The paper addresses these issues by referring to Aquinas’ and Pruss’ idea that there could be evidence favouring God that results in a cognitive state of certainty accompanied by the affective states that deprive people of moral freedom. A relationship with God founded on this evidence would not be personal. Therefore, God is justified in holding such a piece of evidence back (for at least a period of time).

• Language: English
• Keywords: the hiddenness argument, free-will defence, cognitive freedom, moral freedom, the dominant option
• Work type: Article
• Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
• Organization: TEOF - Theological Faculty
• Publication status: Published
• Publication version: Version of Record
• Publication date: 01.01.2022
• Year: 2022
• Number of pages: Str. 33-44
• Numbering: Letn. 82, [št.] 1
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-164082
• UDC: 123:2-183.7
• ISSN on article: 0006-5722
• DOI: 10.34291/BV2022/01/Dobrzeniecki
• COBISS.SI-ID: 114923523
• Publication date in RUL: 17.10.2024

Record is a part of a journal

• Title: Bogoslovni vestnik : glasilo Teološke fakultete v Ljubljani
• Shortened title: Bogosl. vestn.
• Publisher: Teološka fakulteta
• ISSN: 0006-5722
• COBISS.SI-ID: 8745472

Licences

• License: CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
• Link: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Description: This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.

Secondary language

• Language: Slovenian
• Title: Vera v Boga in afektivna stanja : odgovor svobodne volje na argument skritost

Abstract

Članek ponuja novo različico zagovora svobodne volje proti Schellenbergovemu argumentu skritosti. Prejšnjim zagovorom so očitali absolutizacijo človeške svobode in pa to, da ne pokažejo zares, kako lahko kognitivna stanja, povezana z božjim obstojem, omejujejo moralno svobodo ljudi. Članek obravnava omenjena vprašanja s sklicevanjem na idejoTomaža Akvinskega in Prussa o dokazu za obstoj Boga. To vodi v kognitivno stanje gotovosti, ki ga spremljajo afektivna stanja, kar pa ljudem jemlje moralno svobodo. Odnos z Bogom, utemeljen na takšnem dokazu, ne bi bil oseben. Zato lahko Bog takšen dokaz upravičeno zadrži (vsaj za določen čas).

• Keywords: argument skritost, zagovor svobodne volje, kognitivna svoboda, moralna svoboda, prevladujoča izbira