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Vpliv algoritemskega določanja cen na verjetnost tihega dogovarjanja in preferiranja lastnih proizvodov na trgu
ID Zahrastnik, Lea (Author), ID Grilc, Peter (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window

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Abstract
Vedno večja razširjenost umetne inteligence za konkurenčno pravo prinaša številne nove izzive, za katere se zdi, da jih trenutni zakonodajni okvir (še) ne naslavlja. Tradicionalne prakse se namreč spreminjajo in s tem prinašajo nevarnosti za potencialne nove kršitve. Eno izmed večjih težav predstavlja uporaba cenovnih algoritmov, ki lahko z dopuščanjem dogovarjanja brez formalnih sporazumov vodi v tiho dogovarjanje, hkrati pa platformam olajša preferiranje lastnih proizvodov. Trenutno največji problem uporabe protimonopolne zakonodaje je v tem, da se ta lahko v primeru algoritmov uporabi zgolj, če se uspe dokazati, da so algoritmi sposobni doseči in uveljaviti skupno politiko skozi določeno obliko »soglasja volj«. Še večja težava se pojavi v primeru samoučečih se algoritmov, ki omogočajo, da poslovne odločitve v podjetju ne sprejema več človek, temveč računalniški program, s čimer se podjetja lahko izognejo konstituiranju kakršne koli strukture, ki bi jo regulator lahko štel kot dogovarjanje. Uporaba cenovnih algoritmov pa prinaša številne kompleksne izzive tudi z vidika odgovornosti podjetij za protikonkurenčno vedenje algoritmov. Prav zato je regulacija cenovnih algoritmov nujna za zagotavljanje preglednosti in sankcioniranje kršitev, vendar pa se pri njeni zasnovi in izvrševanju ne sme zanemariti pozitivnih učinkov, ki jih prinaša njihova uporaba. Zaradi potencialnih nevarnosti in številnih pomislekov, ki se upravičeno postavljajo v primeru pretirane regulacije cenovnih algoritmov, bo zato ključno, da se v prihodnosti problem celovito preuči in da se poišče optimalna rešitev, ki bo upoštevala tako nevarnosti kot tudi prednosti, ki jih za konkurenčno pravo predstavlja uporaba cenovnih algoritmov.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:algoritemsko določanje cen, vzporedno ravnanje, tiho dogovarjanje, preferiranje lastnih proizvodov, konkurenčno pravo, antitrust
Work type:Master's thesis/paper
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Year:2024
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-163968 This link opens in a new window
COBISS.SI-ID:214639107 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:15.10.2024
Views:185
Downloads:77
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:The Impact of Algorithmic Pricing on the Likelihood of Collusion and Preference of Own Products on the Market
Abstract:
The increasing prevalence of artificial intelligence in competition law presents numerous new challenges that the current legislative framework seems not to address effectively. Traditional practices are evolving, bringing potential risks of new violations. One major issue is the use of pricing algorithms, which can lead to tacit collusion by allowing coordination without formal agreements, while also facilitating platforms in favoring their own products. The biggest problem with applying antitrust legislation to algorithms is that it can only be applied if it can be proven that the algorithms are capable of achieving and enforcing a joint policy through a certain form of "consent of wills". A greater difficulty arises with self-learning algorithms, which allow business decisions to be made by a computer program rather than a human, enabling companies to avoid creating any structure that a regulator might consider collusion. The use of pricing algorithms also presents numerous complex challenges in terms of corporate responsibility for the anticompetitive behavior of algorithms. Therefore, regulating pricing algorithms is crucial for ensuring transparency and sanctioning violations. However, the positive effects of algorithm use must not be overlooked in its design and implementation. Given the potential dangers and the many concerns that are rightly raised in the case of excessive regulation of pricing algorithms, it will therefore be crucial in the future to examine the problem comprehensively and to find an optimal solution that takes into account both the dangers and the competition law benefits of using pricing algorithms.

Keywords:algorithmic pricing, conscious parallelism, tacit collusion, self-preferencing, competition law, antitrust

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