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Primerjava “učinka vabe” in “številnih ekvivalentnih istočasnih ponudb” kot pogajalskih strategij
ID Gotvan, Lana Katarina (Author), ID Zajc, Katarina (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window

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Abstract
V magistrski nalogi predstavim in primerjam dve pogajalski strategiji. V prvem delu naloge pojasnim koncept “učinka vabe” (the decoy effect), ki ga nato ocenim kot pogajalsko strategijo, v drugem delu pa predstavim in ocenim koncept “številnih enakovrednih istočasnih ponudb” (multiple equivalent simultaneous offers, v nadaljevanju: “MESOs”), pri čemer na ustreznih mestih potegnem vzporedice z učinkom vabe. V tretjem delu obe pogajalski strategiji bolj natančno primerjam in analiziram vprašanje, kako struktura pogajanj, moč pogajalca in obstoječi pravni okvir oz. ustaljene prakse posredno vplivajo na izid pogajanj. V svoji nalogi predstavim, da sta tako uporaba MESOs kot uporaba učinka vabe učinkoviti strategiji v integrativnih pogajanjih in vsebujeta elemente, ki prisvajajo in elemente, ki ustvarjajo vrednost. Z izkoriščanjem kognitivnih pristranskosti, ki povzročajo predvidljive “napake” pri človeškem odločanju, si lahko pogajalci v resničnem svetu olajšajo pogajanja. Akterji namreč pogosto ne ravnajo v skladu s predpostavko racionalnosti, na kateri temelji klasična ekonomija, ampak se zanašajo na kognitivne bližnjice. S pomočjo obvladovanja pogajalskih strategij kot sta učinek vabe in uporaba MESOs se lahko posameznik bolj učinkovito spopada s konflikti, izboljša medsebojne odnose, si prisvoji več vrednosti v pogajanjih in sklepa (Pareto) optimalne sporazume.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:pogajanja, pogajalske strategije, učinek vabe, številne enakovredne istočasne ponude, vedenjska ekonomija, ekonomska analiza prava.
Work type:Master's thesis/paper
Typology:2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Year:2022
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-138321 This link opens in a new window
COBISS.SI-ID:116427779 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:15.07.2022
Views:1033
Downloads:179
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Comparison of the "the decoy effect" and "multiple equivalent simultaneous offers" as negotiation strategies
Abstract:
This thesis presents and compares two negotiation strategies. In Part I of the thesis, I explain the concept of the "decoy effect", which I then assess as a negotiation strategy. In Part II of the thesis, I introduce and assess the concept of "multiple equivalent simultaneous offers" (hereinafter, "MESOs") and draw relevant comparisons to the decoy effect. In Part III of the thesis, I compare the two negotiation strategies in more detail and analyse how the structure of the negotiation, negotiating power and the existing legal framework or established practices indirectly influence the outcome of a negotiation. This thesis submits that both the use of MESOs and the use of the decoy effect are effective strategies in integrative negotiations and contain both value-claiming and value-creating elements. Actors often rely on cognitive shortcuts, thus violating the assumption of rationality that underpins classical economics. Hence, negotiators can facilitate negotiations by exploiting cognitive biases that cause predictable "errors" in human decision-making. Through mastering negotiation strategies such as the decoy effect and the use of MESOs, the negotiating parties can deal more effectively with conflict, improve their relationship, claim more value in negotiations and reach (Pareto) optimal agreements.

Keywords:negotiation, negotiation strategies, the decoy effect, multiple equivalent simultaneous offers, behavioural economics, economic analysis of law.

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