Koliko substanc? »De Vriesov problem« v zgodnji recepciji Spinoze

Škraban, Kajetan (author), Božovič, Miran (mentor)

V pismu iz leta 1663 je Simon de Vries Spinozo prosil, naj nekoliko natančneje obrazloži besedilo, ki ga danes poznamo kot opombo k 10. propoziciji prvega dela Etike. V tej opombi Spinoza zatrdi, da obstoj neskončnega števila atributov, ki se pojmujejo sami po sebi, ne ogrozi monizma, ki ga je v splošnem zagovarjal glede substance. De Vries pa je, narobe, menil, da bi se utegnil atribut v skladu s pojmovanjem iz (današnjih) prvih desetih propozicij Etike osamosvojiti in bi tako mogel zadostiti kriterijem substancialnosti: v Spinozovem sistemu bi tako imeli neskončno število substanc. S tem je de Vries zastavil vprašanje, ki zareže v samo jedro spinozizma. Diplomsko delo najprej pretrese sinhroni in diahroni izvor tega problema, nato se razgleda po njegovi obravnavi v zgodnji recepciji Spinozove filozofije (okvirno do konca 17. stoletja), nazadnje pa skuša tudi ponuditi njegovo razrešitev; najprej prek zgodovinske obravnave razvoja pojmov substance in atributa pri Spinozi, nato pa še v njunem imanentnem odnosu v Etiki.

• Language: Slovenian
• Keywords: Spinoza, substanca, atribut, kartezijanstvo
• Work type: Bachelor thesis/paper
• Organization: FF - Faculty of Arts
• Year: 2021
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-131801
• COBISS.SI-ID: 88138499
• Publication date in RUL: 04.10.2021

Secondary language

• Language: English
• Title: How many substances? »De Vries' problem« in early reception of Spinoza

Abstract

In a letter of 1663, Simon de Vries asked Spinoza to explain more precisely the text we know today as the Scholium to Proposition 10 of the first part of the Ethics. In this Scholium Spinoza argues that the existence of an infinite number of attributes that are all conceived in themselves does not compromise the monism he generally advocated regarding the substance. De Vries, however, thought that an attribute could, according to what are today the first ten propositions of the Ethics, emancipate and thus satisfy the criteria of substantiality: in this way, we would have in Spinoza's system an infinite number of substances. De Vries thus raised a question that cuts to the very core of Spinozism. The thesis first examines the synchronic and diachronic origins of this problem, then looks at its treatment in the early reception of Spinoza's philosophy (up to the end of the 17th century), and finally seeks to offer a resolution; first through a historical treatment of the development of the concepts of substance and attribute in Spinoza, and then in their immanent relation in the Ethics.

• Keywords: Spinoza, substance, attribute, Cartesianism