The thesis examines the concept of self-preferencing as a form of abuse of a dominant position. For the purpose of determining when it may constitute an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 of the TFEU, self-preferencing is defined as giving preferential treatment to one’s own downstream subsidiary, thus providing it with a competitive advantage over downstream rivals.
Existing well-established categories of abuses may provide framework for the assessment of dominant undertaking's liability of discriminating against downstream competitors. In this context, it is particularly noteworthy to consider refusals to deal, margin squeezes, tying and discrimination pursuant to Article 102 (c) TFEU. It is noted that none of these forms are designed specifically to assess exclusionary discrimination in a downstream market.
Self-preferencing is the subject of competition law reform in the digital economy. Based on the Commission's decision in Google Search (Shopping), it is reasonable to conclude that favouring one's own services may be subject to competition law assessment outside the framework of the above-mentioned legal bases. It is submitted that the Google Search decision is a precedent which establishes the framework for the assessment of the legality of self-preferencing in the field of digital economies.
|
