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Obveznost razkrivanja nadzorovanih informacij kot notranjih informacij v skladu s 17. členom Uredbe 596/2014/EU
ID Vrankar, Nejc (Author), ID Juhart, Miha (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window

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Abstract
Obveznost razkrivanja nadzorovanih informacij, v tuji literaturi največkrat poimenovana zgolj obvezno razkritje (ang. »mandatory disclosure«) ter v vsebinskem smislu preglednost (ang. »transparency«), zadeva pravila obveznega razkritja informacij širši javnosti na trgu finančnih instrumentov in se naša predvsem na družbe, katerih vrednostni papirji so uvrščeni v trgovanje na organiziranem trgu. Takšni zavezanci so v slovenski zakonodaji poimenovani »javne družbe« , v pravu kapitalskih trgov Evropske unije pa preprosto »izdajatelji«. V skladu s pravili EU morajo izdajatelji vrednostnih papirjev na organiziranih trgih razkriti nekatere ključne informacije, da vlagateljem zagotovijo preglednost (tj. obsežna razkritja informacij trgu (i) ob začetnem zbiranju sredstev, (ii.) redno po tem, ter zlasti (iii.) na določenih točkah, običajno vezanih na pojav pomembnih dogodkov). V pravu EU to področje urejata Direktiva o preglednosti ter Uredba o zlorabah trga, ki predstavljata dva zelo različna vidika obveznega razkritja, kot neposredna posledica njune pravne narave pa so hkrati določbe prve prenesene neposredno v naš pravni sistem, tj. v ZTFI-1, medtem ko se določbe MAR uporabljajo neposredno. Poenostavljeno rečeno, TD ureja razkritje periodičnih (letna poročilo, polletna in druga poročila poslovodstva) in stalnih (tekočih) informacij (pomembni lastniški deleži, informacije glede lastnih delnic, informacije o spremembi števila delnic z glasovalno pravico in sprememba kapitala idr.), MAR pa t.i. ad hoc razkritje notranjih informacij (»cenovno občutljive« informacije, za katere se ocenjuje, da bi lahko verjetno pomembno vplivale na ceno finančnega instrumenta), vse od naštetih pa so vključene v koncept nadzorovanih informacij. V skladu z opisanim je razumljivo, da je presoja ali in kdaj obstaja obveznost razkritja notranjih informacij, v primerjavi s periodičnimi ter tekočimi informacijami, bistveno težja. Zato ni presenetljivo, da javnim družbam v praksi povzroča nemalo težav. To magistrsko diplomsko delo obravnava problematiko omenjene presoje ter skuša s predstavitvijo ugotovitev pravne teorije, tujo nadzorniško prakso in smernicami nadzornih organov, »mehkim pravom« ESMA, sodno prakso EU ter ne nazadnje Priporočili Ljubljanske borze in Agencije za trg vrednostnih papirjev zapolniti vrzeli ter celovito razčleniti obveznosti, ki jih MAR nalaga izdajateljem.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:obveznost razkrivanja nadzorovanih informacij, razkritje notranjih informacij javnosti, odlog razkritja notranjih informacij, preglednost, javne družbe
Work type:Master's thesis/paper
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Year:2019
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-113532 This link opens in a new window
COBISS.SI-ID:17137745 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:17.01.2020
Views:1693
Downloads:260
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Obligation to disclose regulated information as inside information in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation 596/2014/EU
Abstract:
Obligation to disclose regulated information, most often referred to in foreign literature as »mandatory disclosure« and in a substantial sense »transparency«, concerns the rules of obligatory disclosure of information to the general public in financial instruments market, and especially companies whose securities are listed on a regulated market. Such obliged entities are referred to in Slovenian law as »listed companies« and in European Union capital markets law simply as »issuers«. Under EU rules, issuers of securities in regulated markets must disclose certain key information in order to provide investors with transparency (ie, extensive disclosure of information to the market (i) at initial fundraising, (ii) regularly thereafter, and in particular (iii) at certain points, usually related to the occurrence of significant events). In EU law, this area is governed by the Transparency Directive and the Market Abuse Regulation, which represent two very different aspects of mandatory disclosure, and as a direct consequence of their legal nature, provisions of the former are directly transposed into our legal system, ie. in the ZTFI-1, while the MAR provisions apply directly. Simply put, TD regulates the disclosure of periodic (annual, semi-annual and other management reports) and permanent (current) information (significant equity shares, information regarding treasury shares, information on changes in the number of voting shares and changes in equity, etc.), and MAR so called ad hoc disclosure of inside information (»price sensitive« information that is estimated to likely materially affect the price of a financial instrument), all of which are included in the concept of regulated information. Accordingly, it is understandable that the assessment of whether and when there is an obligation to disclose inside information is significantly more difficult than that relating to periodic and current disclosure. It is therefore not surprising that it causes a number of problems for listed companies in practice. This master's thesis deals with the issues of the aforementioned assessment and seeks to fill in the gaps and comprehensively break down the obligations that the MAR imposes on issuers by presenting findings of legal theory, foreign supervisory practice and guidelines of supervisory authorities, ESMA »soft law«, EU case law, and last but not least the Recommendations of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange and the Slovenian Securities Market Agency.

Keywords:obligation to disclose regulated information, disclosure of inside information to the public, delay of disclosure of inside information, transparency, listed companies

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