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Ustavna sredstva parlamentarne opozicije po predlagani spremembi Ustave republike Slovenije
Rutar, Andrej (Author), Kaučič, Igor (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window, Štefanec, Iztok (Co-mentor)

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Abstract
Sistemi organizacije državne oblasti se razlikujejo po načinu delitve oblasti, organih, ki so nosilci te oblasti ter njihovih medsebojnih odnosih. Parlamentarni sistem, ki je uveljavljen tudi pri nas, temelji na načelu delitve oblasti. Organi državne oblasti med seboj sodelujejo, se nadzorujejo, med njimi pa je z namenom preprečitve zlorabe oblasti vzpostavljen sistem zavor in ravnovesij. V moderni demokraciji med strankami na volitvah vedno poteka tekma za čim višje število glasov, zmago na volitvah in prevzem oblasti. Zmagovalna večina se poveže ter oblikuje vlado, stranke, ki niso članice koalicijske večine, pa čakajo na svojo priložnost na naslednjih volitvah. Vendar mora biti njihov glas vseeno slišan, saj odločitve večine postanejo tudi odločitve manjšine, ki mora zato imeti možnost vpliva na sprejemanje odločitev, poleg tega je pomembna tudi možnost nadzora dela koalicijske večine in izvršilne veje oblasti, v ta namen pa ima opozicija na voljo različne instrumente nadzora. Opozicija ima možnost uporabe svojih sredstev na različnih področjih, v okviru zakonodajne, volilne ter nadzorne funkcije Državnega zbora. Nosilec izvršilne oblasti je v parlamentarnih sistemih vlada, ki je parlamentu odgovorna za svoje delo, brez njegove podpore pa ne more delovati. Parlament, znotraj njega zlasti tudi opozicija, ima na voljo več instrumentov nadzora nad delom vlade, najpomembnejši so poslansko vprašanje, interpelacija in konstruktivna nezaupnica. Nesoglasja med parlamentom in vlado lahko privedejo do politične krize, v končni posledici pa tudi do razpustitve parlamenta in novih volitev. Obstaja več različic parlamentarnega sistema, razlikujejo pa se po načinu oblikovanja, sestavi in delovanju vlade. Naša ureditev se zgleduje po nemškem modelu, pri čemer pa v smeri skupščinske ureditve od njega odstopa v nekaterih pomembnih elementih. Predvsem je tu mišljeno imenovanje ministrov s strani Državnega zbora ter s tem povezani instrumenti, ki povečujejo individualno odgovornost posameznih ministrov v razmerju do Državnega zbora, kar je neskladno z modernimi parlamentarnimi sistemi, ki poznajo predvsem kolektivno odgovornost vlade. Taka ureditev relativizira pomen instituta konstruktivne nezaupnice, ki smo ga sprejeli iz nemškega modela. Zaradi naše neučinkovite ureditve bi bile smiselne ustavne spremembe, kar je zaznal tudi Državni zbor, saj je skupina poslancev predlagala spremembo ustavnih določb, ki se nanašajo na oblikovanje Vlade, v odzivu na ta predlog pa je nastal še predlog Strokovne skupine, ki je predlog poslancev analizirala. Ta naloga obravnava predlagani spremembi Ustave, predlog poslancev in predlog Strokovne skupine, s poudarkom na učinke predlaganih sprememb na položaj opozicije. Poleg tega so v nalogi predstavljene tudi nekatere druge možne spremembe Ustave, ki se nanašajo na način oblikovanja Vlade. Vsak predlog spremembe Ustave našo veljavno ureditev približuje določeni podvrsti parlamentarnega sistema. Pred sprejetjem kakršnekoli spremembe Ustave je torej vredno razmisliti, kateri ureditvi se želimo približati in kakšen vpliv na našo trenutno ureditev bi imel sprejem določene spremembe Ustave.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:Državni zbor, vlada, opozicija, postopek oblikovanja vlade, nadzor, konstruktivna nezaupnica, sprememba Ustave.
Work type:Master's thesis/paper (mb22)
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Year:2019
COBISS.SI-ID:16833617 Link is opened in a new window
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Downloads:49
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Constitutional means of the parliamentary opposition by the proposed change of the Constitution of the republic of Slovenia
Abstract:
The systems of state authority differ in the way they separate powers, branches of power that are holders of the power and their relations. The parliamentary system, which is established also in Slovenia, is based on the principle of separation of powers. The branches of state authority collaborate with each other and control the work of one another. The system of checks and balances is set up to prevent the abuse of power. In the modern democracy there has always been a race to get as many votes as possible, win the elections and take over the power among parties in the elections. The majority that wins is united and forms the Government, while parties that are not members of the majority coalition wait for their opportunity in the next elections. However, their voice has to be heard, because the decisions of majority become the decisions of minority as well, that is why they have to have an impact on decision-making. Besides, the possibility of supervision over the part of the majority coalition and the executive branch is important, for this purpose the opposition has different instruments of supervision. The opposition has a possibility of the use of its means on various areas, within the legislative, electoral and supervisory functions of Parliament. The government, which answers to the parliament for its work, but without its support cannot work properly, is the holder of the executive body in the parliamentary systems. The Parliament, and within it, also in particular the opposition, has several instruments for controlling the work of the Government, the most important are parliamentary question, interpellation and constructive vote of no confidence. Disagreements between the Parliament and the Government can lead to the political crisis and ultimately to the dissolution of the Parliament and new elections. There are several variants of parliamentary system, they differ in the way of forming, structure and working of the Government. Our system follows the German model’s example, but as far as assembly is concerned, it differs in some important elements. This mainly refers to the appointment of ministers coming from the National Assembly and instruments referring to it. These instruments are increasing individual responsibility of individual ministers in relation to the National Assembly and that is inconsistent with modern parliamentary systems which are familiar with collective responsibility of the Government in particular. Such system relativizes the meaning of the institute of constructive vote of no confidence which is based on the German’s model. Constitutional changes would be logical due to our ineffective system, this was also noticed by our National Assembly. The group of members of the Parliament proposed a change for constitutional provisions which refer to the forming of the Government. In response to this proposal, the Professional group, which analysed the proposal of the members of the Parliament, formed another one. This master's thesis deals with the proposed change of the Government, the proposal of members of the Parliament and the proposal of the Professional group, with emphasis on the effects of proposed changes regarding the position of the opposition. The thesis also presents some of the other possible constitutional changes that refer to the way of forming the Government. Each proposal of the constitutional change brings about our valid system to get closer to the certain category of the parliamentary system. It is worth considering which system is better and what kind of effect would passing a certain constitutional change cause, before even considering constitutional changes of any kind.

Keywords:National Assembly, the Government, the opposition, the procedure of forming the Government, supervision, constructive vote of no confidence, constitutional change.

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