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Narava človeka v pravu - pomen filozofske antropologije za preučevanje prava
ID Pengov, Jaka (Author), ID Novak, Aleš (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window, ID Žalec, Bojan (Co-mentor)

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Abstract
V doktorski razpravi postavim hipotezo, da vsakokratna opredelitev in razumevanje človekove narave v pomembni meri določita pravo na meta-, makro- in mikroravni pojavnosti. Določita torej vsakokratno refleksijo o pravu (ali filozofijo prava), temeljne pojme splošnega in abstraktnega prava (ki so predmet teorije prava) in način uporabe prava (posamično in konkretno pravno odločanje). Zato trdim, da je preučevanje vsakokratnega pojmovanja človekove narave ena od nalog filozofije prava. Pojem človekove narave preučuje filozofska antropologija, zato predlagam njeno vpeljavo na polje preučevanja prava, in sicer v sodobni personalistični različici, ki na vprašanje o človekovi naravi ne odgovori enopomensko in absolutno dokončno, ampak se zaveda težavnosti opredelitve človekovega bistva in nevarnosti prevlade ene same ideje o človeku. Takšna filozofska antropologija prispeva k celovitemu obravnavanju človeka v pravu, kajti pravo je odraz raznovrstnih lastnosti človeka oziroma odraz različnih antropoloških predpostavk, ki vsaka zase ne izčrpajo možnosti vsebinske opredelitve človekove narave. Jedrno besedilo doktorske razprave razdelim na dva dela. V prvem se vprašam, ali in kako pojmovanje človekove narave prispeva k določitvi filozofije prava pri nekaterih najpomembnejših avtorjih in v okviru njenih osrednjih smeri; nadalje me zanima, ali in kako pojmovanje človekove narave prispeva k določitvi nekaterih temeljnih pojmov splošnega in abstraktnega prava (ki jih preučuje teorija prava); nazadnje preučim, ali in kako pojmovanje človekove narave zaznamuje uporabo prava pri konkretnem in posamičnem pravnem odločanju. V drugem jedrnem delu doktorske razprave, v katerem nadgradim spoznanja iz prvega jedrnega dela, odgovorim na vprašanje, ali je na različnih ravneh pravne pojavnosti mogoče upravičeno govoriti o enem samem in izoliranem pojmovanju človekove narave, ali pa je antropoloških predpostavk prava (tako sinhrono kakor diahrono) več in je možna njihova kohabitacija; pregledam in ovrednotim implikacije tipa pravoslovne vednosti, ki temelji na vsebinsko enostranski antropološki predpostavki ter tovrstno obravnavo človekove narave primerjam z načinom obravnave, ki ga ponudi sodobna personalistično usmerjena filozofska antropologija; zanima me, ali se sodobna (personalistično naravnana) filozofska antropologija s svojim pristopom k obravnavi človekove narave približa in kje bi utegnile biti njene stične točke z integrativnim preučevanjem prava; ko in ker stične točke najdem, se nazadnje vprašam, ali in zakaj je filozofska antropologija lahko pomembna za filozofijo prava (in širše: za preučevanje prava). Doktorsko razpravo umestim na področje filozofije prava, moj pristop k preučevanju prava je interdisciplinaren, za razumevanje prava pa ni dovolj poznati zgolj pravnih norm, temveč tudi dejstva in vrednote ter genezo nastanka sodobnega prava, s čimer se približam integrativnemu pravoznanstvu. Glavno pozornost namenim sodobnemu pravu kot (post)modernemu pravu rimsko-germanskega in (delno) anglo-ameriškega kulturnega kroga. Interdisciplinarno preučevanje prava vključuje povezavo vednosti o pravu s filozofsko antropologijo. »Človekove narave« kot osrednjega predmeta filozofske antropologije ne razumem kot dejstva, ki zahteva določeno naravo, obliko in vsebino prava, ampak kot normativno kategorijo, ki je pogosto »zamaskirana« v (naravno) dejstvo, kar lahko na področju prava in širše povzroči nastanek nevarnih ideoloških obrazcev. Naloga sodobne personalistično orientirane filozofske antropologije je, da razvoj in implikacije tovrstnih vzorcev prepozna ter določi, pod katerimi pogoji je na področju prava in njegovega preučevanja mogoče (ne-ideološko ali čim manj apodiktično) govoriti o »človekovi naravi«. V tem je pomemben in daljnosežen prispevek filozofske antropologije, zaradi katerega predlagam njeno vpeljavo na področje preučevanja prava. Možnost in nevarnost ideologizacije »človekove narave« ne sme zamegliti temeljnega prepričanja, da je pravo v celoti človeški pojav oziroma pojav, za katerega ne moremo dokazljivo reči, da ga lahko spozna in uporablja kdorkoli drug kot človek. Od tod izvira naloga filozofije prava in pravoznanstva, da z izbiro pravilne metode pristopita k obravnavi »človekove narave« kot k eni od predpostavk pojava prava. Filozofija prava in pravoznanstvo lahko pojem človekove narave obravnavata zlasti na dva temeljna načina: (1) obravnavata lahko vsakokratno (prevladujočo) antropološko predpostavko kot dejavnik, ki pomembno določi pravo na različnih ravneh njegove pojavnosti, in (2) (v okviru nauka o naravi stvari) lahko upoštevata človekove lastnosti in danosti kot stvarnost, ki so-določa (predvsem) vsebino na abstraktni in konkretni ravni prava. Obravnava »podobe človeka v pravu« in človeških danosti z uporabo nauka o naravi stvari sta prispevka k humanistični filozofiji prava. Ne- in protiideološka obravnava pojma človekove narave je humanistična iz dveh razlogov: (1) zaveda se, da je v središču prava človek z individualnimi in kolektivnimi, bolj ali manj univerzalnimi, a vselej tudi kontingenčnimi značilnostmi, ki jih (niti ene do njih) ni dopustno puščati vnemar (če so v zvezi s predmetom pravnega urejanja) in zaradi tega zavedanja (2) ne izključuje nič od tistega, kar je, ali bi lahko bilo človeško, s tem pa utrjuje človeško mero pravo in brani vrhovno vrednoto človekovega dostojanstva.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:filozofija prava, filozofska antropologija, človekova narava, integrativno pravoznanstvo, personalizem, pravni subjekt, oseba, podoba človeka v pravu, ekonomska analiza prava, Gustav Radbruch, narava stvari, pogajanja o priznanju krivde
Work type:Doctoral dissertation
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Year:2018
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-105474 This link opens in a new window
COBISS.SI-ID:16470097 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:01.12.2018
Views:2758
Downloads:516
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:The Nature of Man in Law - The Importance of Philosophical Anthropology for Legal Studies
Abstract:
In this doctoral thesis, I set out the hypothesis that the respective definition and understanding of human nature to a significant extent determine the law at meta-, macro- and micro-phenomenon, and thus determine respective reflection on the law (or the philosophy of law), the basic concepts of general and abstract law (which are the subject of the theory of law), and the way of applying the law (individual and concrete legal decision-making); therefore, I argue that the study of respective conception of human nature is one of the tasks of the philosophy of law. The concept of human nature is studied by philosophical anthropology; therefore, I propose its introduction into the field of the study of law, in a contemporary personalistic version, which does not discuss human nature in an unambiguous and absolutely definite way, but is aware of the difficulty of defining the human essence and the danger of predominance of one single idea of man. Such philosophical anthropology contributes to the overall treatment of man in law, as the law is a reflection of the diverse characteristics of man, or a reflection of various anthropological assumptions, which each in themselves do not fully embrace the possibility of a substantive definition of human nature. The core text of this thesis is divided in two parts. In the first part, I ask myself whether and how the conception of human nature contributes to determining the philosophy of the law in respect of some of the most important authors and within its central fields; furthermore, I am interested in whether and how the conception of human nature contributes to the definition of some basic concepts of general and abstract law (studied by the theory of law); finally, I examine whether and how the conception of human nature marks the application of the law in concrete and individual legal decision-making. In the second core part of the doctoral thesis, in which I upgrade the findings from the first core part, I answer the question of whether one can rightly speak of a single and isolated conception of human nature at the various levels of the legal phenomenon, or whether there are many anthropological assumptions of the law (both synchronous and diachronic) and the possibility of their coexistence; I review and evaluate the implications of a jurisprudence knowledge type, which bases on a substantially unilateral anthropological assumption, and compare such treatment of human nature with the method of treatment offered by contemporary personalistically-oriented philosophical anthropology; I am interested in whether contemporary (personalistically-oriented) philosophical anthropology approaches the treatment of human nature and in its points of contact with the integrative study of the law; when and because I determine the contact points, I finally wonder whether and why philosophical anthropology can be important for the philosophy of law (and more broadly: to the study of law). I place the doctoral thesis into the field of the philosophy of law; my approach to the study of law is interdisciplinary; the understanding of the law requires the knowledge of not only legal norms, but also the facts and values and the genesis of the creation of a contemporary law, by which I approach integrative jurisprudence. I devote the main attention to contemporary law as the (post) modern law of the Roman-Germanic and (partially) Anglo-American cultural circle. The interdisciplinary study of law involves linking knowledge of law with philosophical anthropology. I fail to understand “human nature”, the central subject of philosophical anthropology, as a fact which requires a certain nature, form, and subject-matter of the law, but as a normative category, which is often “disguised” in a (natural) fact, which can cause dangerous ideological forms in the field of the law and the wider area. The task of contemporary personalistically-oriented philosophical anthropology is to recognise the development and implications of such patterns and determine under which conditions it is possible (non-ideologically or the least apodictically) to speak of “human nature” in the field of law and its study. This is an important and far-reaching contribution of philosophical anthropology, which is why I propose its introduction into the field of the study of law. The possibility of the ideologisation of “human nature” should not blur the fundamental belief that the law is entirely a human phenomenon or phenomenon, for which we cannot provable say that it can be recognised and used by anyone other than man. Whence the task of the philosophy of law and jurisprudence to approach, with the selection of the right method, to the treatment of “human nature” as to one of the assumptions for the emergence of law. The philosophy of law and jurisprudence can deal with the concept of human nature in two basic ways: (1) they can treat the respective (dominant) anthropological assumption as a factor, which relevantly determines the law at different levels of its phenomenon, and (2) (in the context of teachings on the nature of things) they can consider human characteristics and features as a reality which co-determines (in particular) the content at the abstract and concrete level of the law. The treatment of “the image of the man in the law” and human features using the theory of the nature of things are contributions to the humanistic philosophy of law. Neo-and anti-ideological treatment of the concept of human nature is humanistic for two reasons: (1) it is aware that the man with individual and collective, more or less universal, but always contingent characteristics, which (not even one of them) should not be disregarded (if they are related to the subject of legal regulation) is in the centre of the law, and because of this awareness (2) fails to exclude anything that is or could be human, thereby consolidating the human dimension of law and defending the supreme value of human dignity.

Keywords:philosophy of law, philosophical anthropology, human nature, integrative jurisprudence, personalism, legal person, person, picture of a man in law, economic analysis of law, Gustav Radbruch, nature of things, plea bargaining

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