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Mednarodnopravna razlaga zahteve za pogajanja kot predpogoja soglasja države k mednarodni investicijski arbitraži
ID Turšič, Domen (Author), ID Sancin, Vasilka (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window

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Abstract
V večini od 855 znanih primerov mednarodne investicijske arbitraže je bil podlaga za arbitražo mednarodni investicijski sporazum, v katerem država ponudi soglasje za arbitražo vnaprej nedoločenim investitorjem. 81% mednarodnih investicijskih sporazumov vsebuje zahtevo, da se morata investitor in država določen čas pogajati, preden lahko investitor vloži tožbo. Navkljub temu, da so mednarodni investicijski tribunali glede narave tovrstne zahteve prišli do različnih zaključkov, predstavlja izpolnitev zahteve za pogajanja po mnenju avtorja pogoj, brez katerega soglasje države za mednarodno investicijsko arbitražo ni podano. V mednarodni arbitražni praksi se lahko razlaga zahtev za pogajanja razdeli na dve glavni fazi. V prvi, zgodnejši, so mednarodni investicijski tribunali, po zgledu drugih mednarodnih sodišč, zahteve za pred-arbitražna pogajanja razlagali zelo milo in v korist investitorja. Pogajanja naj ne bi bila 'jurisdikcijska', temveč zgolj 'postopkovna' zahteva, ki ne vpliva na pristojnost tribunala. Po mnenju teh tribunalov bi strožja razlaga zahteve za predhodna pogajanja to lahko spremenila iz orodja za zagotavljanje učinkovitega sistema reševanja sporov v instrument zavlačevanja in stroškovne neučinkovitosti. V drugi, danes prevladujoči, fazi, so se tribunali, zopet po zgledu drugih mednarodnih sodišč (predvsem Meddržavnega sodišča), osredotočili na koncept soglasja za arbitražo v luči načela suverenosti. Tako soglasja ni, če niso izpolnjeni pogoji, ki jih je država temu soglasju postavila. Obveznost pogajanj, kot obveznost prizadevanja, pa ni absolutna, saj od investitorja ne moremo zahtevati pogajanj, če bi ta bila očitno neučinkovita. Ob tem pa je dokazno breme na investitorju, s strogim dokaznim standardom. Magistrsko delo se dotakne tudi klavzule največjih ugodnosti, ki po mnenju avtorja, če v njih ni izrecno zapisano drugače, ne bi smela vplivati na zahtevo za pogajanja.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:mednarodno investicijsko pravo, mednarodna investicijska arbitraža, pristojnost mednarodnih investicijskih tribunalov, pogajanja, soglasje države
Work type:Master's thesis/paper
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Year:2018
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-103711 This link opens in a new window
COBISS.SI-ID:16368977 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:23.09.2018
Views:2660
Downloads:717
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:International Legal Interpretation of the Obligation to Negotiate as a Precondition of the Consent of a State to International Investment Arbitration
Abstract:
The basis of the majority of the 855 international investment arbitrations known to - date was an international investment agreement in which a State offers consent to arbitrate to investors that are unknown to it at the time of concluding the agreement. 81% of international investment agreements incorporate an obligation to negotiate, according to which an investor and the State must negotiate for a certain period of time before an investor may submit its claim to arbitration. According to the author, a State’s consent to arbitrate is not given if the obligation to negotiate is not fulfilled, despite international investment tribunals arriving at different conclusions regarding the nature of such an obligation. Concerning the interpretation of the obligation to negotiate, international investment arbitral practice can be divided into two phases. In the first phase, the interpretation followed decisions of other international courts and was quite lenient in favour of investors. The obligation to negotiate was not seen as 'jurisdictional' but rather as 'procedural', thus not affecting the tribunal's jurisdiction. According to these tribunals, a stricter interpretation could transform negotiations from a tool that enables a more effective resolution of disputes into instruments for delaying the procedure and making it less cost-effective. In the second phase, which is the leading argumentation today, tribunals put greater emphasis on the concept of consent to arbitrate in light of the principle of State sovereignty, again following certain decisions of other international courts (the ICJ in particular). Consent cannot be deemed to be given by the State if the conditions of such a consent have not been met. The obligation to negotiate as an obligation of conduct is not absolute since it has exceptions such as futility. However, the burden of proof in such cases is on the investor and the standard of proof is strict. The master thesis also touches upon the MFN clause, which, according to the author, should not affect the obligation to negotiate unless it expressly provides otherwise.

Keywords:international investment law, international investment arbitration, jurisdiction of international investment tribunals, negotiation, consent

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