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Kolizija človekovih pravic v ustavnosodni presoji
Štefanec, Iztok (Author), Zagorc, Saša (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window

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Abstract
Človekove pravice niso le vrednostno privlačna vsebina, ki zveni mamljivo in se jo zato široko uporablja v številnih diskurzih izven sveta prava. S tem ni prav nič narobe, škodljivo pa bi bilo, če bi pozabili na njihov temelj, ki je v pravu. Človekove pravice so najprej in predvsem pravna kategorija z normativnimi lastnostmi sui generis. Človekove pravice lahko, če se jih udejanja, zagotovijo višjo stopnjo spoštovanja posameznikovega dostojanstva. Ali bo v nekem pravnem redu temu res tako, še zdaleč ni odvisno le od tega, kako ustava definira posamezne človekove pravice. To postane očitno že, če vemo, da pravni opredelitvi pravice že v naslednjem odstavku pogosto sledi omejitvena klavzula, ki poenostavljeno rečeno sporoča, da pravica pod določenimi pogoji morda sploh ne bo deležna varstva. Prava slika spoštovanja človekovih pravic se v pravu izriše šele, ko predmet njihovega varstva trči ob oviro. Šele takrat se pokaže, koliko normativne teže premorejo človekove pravice v določenem pravnem redu. Na to vplivajo številni dejavniki, ki jih v disertaciji identificiram in proučujem kot dejavnike omejljivosti človekovih pravic. Človekove pravice niso le tisto, kar je zapisano v ustavi in drugih aktih. Te določbe so praviloma skromne. Človekove pravice in njihovo pravno naravo lahko ustrezno razumemo le, če poznamo njihove zgodovinske in vrednostne temelje ter vlogo, ki jo opravljajo v pravnem redu. Okoliščina, kako pravni red razume vrednostne temelje in funkcijo človekovih pravic, pomembno vpliva na njihovo omejevanje in razreševanje kolizij. Ni vseeno, če pravni red neguje naravnopravne temelje človekovih pravic, ali pa so mu bližji utilitaristični nazori in golo pozitivistično razumevanje prava in človekovih pravic. Na (ustavno)sodno odločanje in omejljivost človekovih pravic lahko vpliva tudi to, kako pozitivno pravo opredeljuje vrednostne temelje človekovih pravic. Vsekakor se sodoben koncept človekovih pravic razlikuje od razumevanja prava v času njihovega nastanka. Pozitivno pravo lahko človekove pravice po eni strani ogrozi, po drugi strani pa si njihovega učinkovitega varstva brez pozitivnega prava ni več mogoče predstavljati. Uresničevanje in omejevanje človekovih pravic bo v praksi odvisno od številnih pravnih prvin. Te soopredeljujejo pravno naravo človekovih pravic in različno učinkujejo tudi kot dejavniki njihove omejljivosti. V disertaciji se ukvarjam z različnimi materialnopravnimi in formalnopravnimi prvinami, npr. s pozitivnopravno opredeljenostjo vrednostnih temeljev človekovih pravic, trdnostjo določb o človekovih pravicah, abstraktnostjo določb o človekovih pravicah, vplivom mednarodnega prava na njihovo omejljivost, različnimi kategorijami človekovih pravic in njihovo omejljivostjo. Omejevanje človekovih pravic v širšem ali ožjem pomenu vse pogosteje zavzema osrednje mesto prava človekovih pravic. To ne preseneča, če vemo, da človekove pravice praviloma niso in ne morejo biti neomejljive (tj. absolutne), temveč jih je treba v vsakdanjem življenju pogosto uravnotežiti s pravicami drugih ali z upoštevnimi interesi skupnosti in države. Primeri kolizije človekovih pravic odpirajo zapletena pravna vprašanja, ki se jim zakonodajalec, sodišča in drugi nosilci oblasti ne morejo preprosto izogniti, temveč jih morajo ustrezno nasloviti. V teh primerih igrajo nekateri dejavniki omejljivosti človekovih pravic posebej pomembno vlogo, saj neposredno vplivajo na zakonodajno urejanje takšnih nasprotij in na (ustavno)sodno razreševanje sporov, ki ob tem neizbežno nastanejo. Ker ima na tem področju najpomembnejšo in zadnjo besedo ustavno sodišče, ustavnosodna praksa pa povratno vpliva tudi na druge nosilce oblasti, te dejavnike omejljivosti človekovih pravic proučujem kot dejavnike ustavnosodne presoje kolizije človekovih pravic. V disertaciji podrobneje obravnavam tri dejavnike omejljivosti človekovih pravic, ki so hkrati vplivni dejavniki ustavnosodne presoje kolizije človekovih pravic. Najprej se posvetim omejitvenim klavzulam, nato razločevanju med določanjem načina uresničevanja in omejevanjem pravic ter nazadnje testu legitimnosti. Omejitvene klavzule so tiste določbe, ki pravno urejajo omejevanje človekovih pravic. S predpisovanjem meril in pogojev za omejevanje človekovih pravic odločujoče vplivajo na to, v kolikšni meri bodo človekove pravice na koncu uresničljive. Omogočanje omejevanja človekovih pravic pa ni edina vloga omejitvenih klavzul. Njihova, z vidika spoštovanja človekovih pravic nemara še pomembnejša vloga je v omejevanju pristojnosti zakonodajalca, da omeji človekove pravice. Omejitvene klavzule se med seboj močno razlikujejo glede na določnost, jasnost, abstraktnost in konkretnost, splošnost in posamičnost, ter po tem, ali učinkujejo po formalni (oblikovni) ali materialni (vsebinski) plati. Nenazadnje je pravna razlaga omejitvenih klavzul odvisna tudi od samega razumevanja vrednostnih temeljev in konceptualne zasnove človekovih pravic in njihovega omejevanja. Za izid ustavnosodne presoje je lahko odločilnega pomena, ali gre za vprašanje, ali sporno upravičenje sodi v normativno polje določene človekove pravice (tj. domet človekove pravice), ali pa za vprašanje, ali naj mu pravo odtegne varstvo iz razloga, ker je treba pravico v tem delu omejiti zaradi varstva pravic drugih ali drugih pravno zavarovanih dobrin (tj. omejitev človekove pravice). Močan učinek na ustavnosodno presojo, zlasti slovensko, ima tudi razločevanje med določanjem načina uresničevanja človekovih pravic in njihovim omejevanjem. Ustava RS med kategorijama izrecno ločuje. Določanje načina uresničevanja človekovih pravic pomeni zlasti podrobnejše opredeljevanje človekovih pravic ter vzpostavljanje vseh mehanizmov, potrebnih za to, da bo uresničevanje pravic lahko učinkovito v praksi. Omejevanje človekovih pravic pomeni krčenje obsega njihovega uresničevanja iz razloga, da bi lahko hkrati zavarovali tudi pravice drugih, javni interes in druge pravno zavarovane dobrine. Pri tem se zastavi vprašanje, ali ni to tudi naloga nekaterih zakonskih norm, ki določajo način uresničevanja pravic. Ustava RS ločeno pooblašča zakonodajalca, da lahko določi način uresničevanja človekove pravice, in ločeno, kadar sme človekovo pravico omejiti. Zakonodajalec sme tako postopati le, če ima za to ustrezno ustavno podlago v določbah Ustave RS. Dosledno in prepričljivo razlikovanje med zakonskimi ukrepi, ki pomenijo način uresničevanja človekove pravice in tistimi, ki pomenijo omejitev človekove pravice, pa ni pomembno le za zakonodajalca. Pomembno je tudi zato, ker Ustavno sodišče ene in druge zakonske norme presoja z različnimi merili. Zakonske norme, ki določajo način uresničevanja pravic (izvršitvene norme), presoja s testom razumnosti, zakonske norme, ki pravice omejujejo (omejevalne norme), pa presoja s testom sorazmernosti. V izhodišče raziskovanja v tem okviru postavljam dve tezi. Prva predpostavlja, da kriteriji, s katerimi Ustavno sodišče odloči, ali zakon določa način uresničevanja človekove pravice ali pa jo omejuje, niso dovolj prepričljivi, predvidljivi in jasni. Ta in drugi razlogi nas pripeljejo do druge teze, ki predpostavlja, da bi moralo Ustavno sodišče namesto testa razumnosti pri ustavnosodni presoji uporabljati test sorazmernosti. To naj bi zagotovilo višjo raven (ustavnosodnega) varstva človekovih pravic. Pravilnost teze ocenim tudi z vidika spoštovanja ustavnega načela delitve oblasti. V zadnjem delu disertacije obravnavam test legitimnosti, katerega bistvo je v oceni, ali je imel zakonodajalec (ali drug nosilec oblasti) ustavno dopusten razlog za omejitev človekove pravice. Ni vsak cilj, ki ga želi zakonodajalec uresničiti tako, da pri tem poseže v človekovo pravico, ustavno dopusten. Npr. cilj obvarovati politično stabilnost in preprečiti padec vlade ne more biti ustavno dopusten razlog za prepoved javnega zbiranja. Ustavnemu sodišču se zato niti ne bo treba spuščati v nadaljnjo presojo takšnega ukrepa. S testom legitimnosti pa se ne presoja le ustavne dopustnosti zasledovanega cilja, temveč se test pogosto osredotoči tudi na stvarno upravičenost zasledovanega cilja. V disertaciji je zato govora o dveh obrazih testa legitimnosti. V okviru ocene stvarne upravičenosti zasledovanega cilja gre npr. za vprašanje, ali so podane takšne dejanske okoliščine, ki upravičujejo poseg v človekovo pravico (npr. ogroženost javnega interesa, kot je denimo varnost države). Ustave in drugi katalogi človekovih pravic različno določno opredeljujejo legitimne cilje, zaradi katerih je dopustno omejiti posamezne človekove pravice. Zasnova omejitvenih klavzul v tem pogledu močno vpliva na manevrski prostor zakonodajalca (načelo delitve oblasti), hkrati pa tudi na zasnovo testa legitimnosti in strogost z njim povezane ustavnosodne presoje. Vse skupaj pa sooblikuje koncept človekovih pravic, ki je v določenem pravnem redu v veljavi. Če je namreč mogoče omejiti človekove pravice zaradi doseganja številnih, tudi nepomembnih ciljev, to rahlja posebno normativno težo človekovih pravic in ogroža njihove naravnopravne temelje. Pomemben dejavnik ustavnosodne presoje kolizije človekovih pravic ni le besedilo omejitvenih klavzul samo po sebi, temveč tudi pravna interpretacija teh določb. V disertaciji se podrobneje ukvarjam z vprašanjem razlage omejitvene klavzule iz tretjega odstavka 15. člena Ustave RS. Če jo je Ustavno sodišče v zgodnejši sodni praksi razumelo tako, da dopušča omejevanje človekovih pravic le zaradi varstva pravic drugih in v primerih, ki jih določa ustava, je njen domet skozi leta občutno razširilo. Danes Ustavno sodišče stoji na stališču, da je treba te določbe razumeti tako, da dopuščajo omejevanje človekovih pravic tudi zaradi varstva javnega interesa. V tem okviru preverjam, kako so postopne spremembe v razlagi te omejitvene klavzule vplivale na zasnovo testa legitimnosti in njegovo vlogo v ustavnosodni presoji ter kakšni so bili razlogi za takšno postopanje Ustavnega sodišča. Ob tem se ne morem izogniti tudi širšemu in nemara usodnejšemu vprašanju: kako spremembe razlage omejitvene klavzule iz tretjega odstavka 15. člena Ustave RS vplivajo na konceptualno zasnovo, normativno težo in vlogo človekovih pravic v slovenskem ustavnem redu in kaj pomenijo za raven njihovega varstva v prihodnosti?

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:vrednostni temelji človekovih pravic, omejljivost človekovih pravic, omejitvene klavzule, kolizija pravic, določanje načina uresničevanja človekovih pravic, test razumnosti, test legitimnosti, test sorazmernosti, strogost ustavnosodne presoje
Work type:Doctoral dissertation (mb31)
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Year:2018
COBISS.SI-ID:16326225 Link is opened in a new window
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Collision of Human Rights in Constitutional Review
Abstract:
Human rights are not merely an attractive topic for discussing values and one which is broadly used in numerous discourses outside the world of law due to its general appeal. There is no fault in doing this, it would, however, be harmful if we were to forget about their legal foundation. First and foremost, human rights are a legal category with sui generis normative properties. If realized, human rights can ensure a higher level of respect for human dignity. Whether this will be the case within a certain legal order, depends on much more than only the way human rights are defined in the constitution. This becomes evident if we acknowledge that the legal definition of a right is usually immediately followed by a limitation clause, which – to put it simply – lays down that, under specific conditions, the right may not be afforded legal protection at all. The reality of how much human rights are truly respected within the law can only be observed once the rights subject to protection encounter an obstacle. It is only at that time that the true normative force of human rights within a certain legal order becomes evident. This is affected by numerous factors that are identified and explored in the following thesis as the factors of human rights limitability. Human rights go beyond what is written in the constitution and other legal instruments, where provisions are generally modest. Human rights along with their legal nature can be adequately understood only if one is familiar with their historical and moral foundations and their role in the legal order. The circumstances of how a legal order interprets moral foundations and the function of human rights importantly affects their limitation and the resolution of collisions. It is not insignificant whether a legal order fosters human rights founded on natural law or whether it is more inclined towards utilitarian beliefs and a strict positivist understanding of law and human rights. (Constitutional) judicial decision-making and human rights limitability can also be affected by how positive law defines the moral foundations of human rights. There is no doubt that the modern conception of human rights differs from their legal perception at the time of their emergence. On one hand, positive law can nowadays undermine human rights, while on the other, it is impossible to imagine their effective protection in the absence of it. In practice, exercising and limiting human rights depends on numerous legal elements. These co-define the legal nature of human rights and at the same time have diverse effects as factors of their limitability. The following thesis deals with different elements of substantive and formal law; e.g. how the moral foundations of human rights are defined within positive law, the strength of human rights provisions, the abstract nature of human rights provisions, the influence of international law on their limitability, different categories of human rights and their limitability. The limitation of human rights in its broad or narrow sense is increasingly becoming the central topic of human rights law. This is not surprising if we acknowledge that human rights are generally not and cannot be illimitable (i.e. absolute). In everyday life, they frequently have to be balanced with the rights of others or with the pertinent interests of the community and the state. Cases of human rights collisions pose complex legal questions, which cannot simply be evaded by the legislator, courts and other public authorities, but must be addressed correctly. Some factors of human rights limitability play an especially important role in these cases, as they directly affect the legislative regulation of such conflicts and the (constitutional) judicial resolution of disputes that inevitably arise. Since the constitutional court is the most important and final adjudicator in this field, and the constitutional case-law, in turn, affects other public authorities, the thesis explores these factors of human rights limitability as factors of constitutional review in human rights collision cases. The thesis discusses in detail three factors of human rights limitability, which are at the same time significant factors in the constitutional review of human rights collision cases. It firstly addresses limitation clauses, later discusses the distinction between determining the manner of exercising rights and the limitation of rights, and lastly, focuses on the legitimate aim test. Limitation clauses are the provisions which legally regulate the limitation of human rights. By prescribing criteria and conditions for the limitation of human rights, they decisively affect how human rights are ultimately exercised. However, facilitating the limitation of human rights is not the only purpose of limitation clauses. From the viewpoint of respecting human rights, their perhaps even greater role lies in restricting the legislator’s powers to limit the rights. Limitation clauses differ greatly depending on how specific, clear, abstract and concrete, general and particular they are, and on whether they have formal (formative, procedural) or material (substantive) effect. Moreover, the legal interpretation of limitation clauses also depends on the sheer understanding of moral foundations and the concept behind human rights and their limitations. The outcome of a constitutional review may be decisively affected by whether the contested right falls within the normative field of a particular human right (i.e. the scope of a human right) or whether the law should deny its protection on the grounds that the right must, in this part, be limited in order to protect the rights of others or other legally protected interests (i.e. the limitation of a human right). The constitutional review, especially in Slovenia, is strongly affected by the distinction between determining the manner in which human rights are exercised and their limitation. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia explicitly separates the two categories. Determining the manner in which human rights are exercised mainly refers to defining human rights in greater detail and establishing all necessary mechanisms required for the effective exercise of these rights in practice. Limiting human rights refers to narrowing the extent of their exercise on the grounds of simultaneously protecting the rights of others, the public interest, and other legally protected interests. The question here is whether this is not, at the same time, within the purview of some legislative norms that determine the manner of how rights are exercised. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia authorizes the legislator to determine the manner of exercising human rights and separately authorizes him for cases when human rights can be limited. The legislator may take any of both actions only when there is an appropriate constitutional basis for it provided in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. A consistent and straightforward distinction between legal measures that constitute how human rights are exercised and the measures that constitute the limitation of human rights is not relevant exclusively to the legislator. It is also significant due to the fact that the Constitutional Court reviews both types of legislative norms based on different criteria. Legislative norms that determine the manner of exercising rights (outworking norms) are reviewed by using the rational basis test, while legislative norms that limit rights (limiting norms) are reviewed by using the proportionality test. In this respect, the thesis places two hypotheses at its central research focus. The first hypothesis assumes that the criteria used by the Constitutional Court in order to decide if a law determines the manner of exercising a human right or whether it limits the right are insufficiently convincing, predictable and clear. By taking this and other reasons into account, we come to the second hypothesis, which assumes that, when carrying out a constitutional review, the Constitutional Court should apply the proportionality test instead of the rational basis test. This would ensure a higher level of (constitutional) human rights protection. Within the thesis, the correctness of the hypothesis is also assessed from the viewpoint of respecting the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. The last part of the thesis deals with the legitimate aim test, the purpose of which is to assess whether a legislator (or another public authority) had constitutionally admissible grounds for limiting a human right. Not all goals, which the legislator wishes to realize by encroaching a human right, are constitutionally admissible. The goal of preserving political stability and preventing governmental collapse cannot be constitutionally admissible grounds for prohibiting public gatherings. Thus, the Constitutional Court will not be required to further review this type of measure. The legitimate aim test is not used solely for reviewing the constitutional admissibility of a pursued goal; it also frequently focuses on whether the pursued goal is objectively (factually) justified. The thesis accordingly discusses two aspects of the legitimate aim test. Assessing the objective (factual) justification of a pursued goal, for example, raises a question about the existence of factual circumstances that justify the encroachment upon a certain human right (e.g. a threat to the public interest such as state security). There are differences in how specifically constitutions and other human rights catalogues define legitimate aims that render limiting a human right admissible. In this respect, the way in which limitation clauses are conceived strongly affects the legislator’s margin of appreciation (the separation of powers principle) and at the same time influences the concept behind the legitimate aim test and the intensity of the therewith connected constitutional review. All of this then co-creates the human rights concept adopted in a specific legal order. Limiting human rights in order to pursue countless, even insignificant goals weakens the special normative force of human rights and poses a threat to their natural law foundations. In addition to the text itself, the legal interpretation of the limitation clause provisions is also important for the constitutional review of human rights collision cases. The thesis discusses in detail the interpretation of the limitation clause provided in paragraph 3, Article 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. In its early case-law, the Constitutional Court interpreted the clause as permitting the limitation of human rights only in order to protect the rights of others and in such cases as are provided by the Constitution, however, the scope of the clause has been significantly expanded throughout the years. Nowadays, the Constitutional Court maintains that these provisions are to be understood in such a way as to allow the limitation of human rights also for the protection of public interest. The thesis examines how gradual changes in the interpretation of this clause have affected the concept behind the legitimate aim test, its role in constitutional review and why the Constitutional Court has decided to develop and adopt this course of action. By doing this, it inevitably addresses a broader and perhaps more fateful question: how the changes in the interpretation of the limitation clause provided in paragraph 3, Article 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia affect the concept, normative force and role of human rights in the Slovenian constitutional order and what significance they bear for their level of protection in the future.

Keywords:moral foundations of human rights, limitability of rights, limitation clauses, collision of rights, determining the manner of exercising human rights, rational basis test, legitimate aim test, proportionality test, intensity of constitutional review

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