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Moralno razumevanje prava
Škrinjar, Matic (Author), Novak, Aleš (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window

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Abstract
Magistrska naloga v najširšem smislu obravnava razmerje med pravom in moralo. Zagovarja stališče, da je za pravilno razumevanje prava treba upoštevati moralna načela, ki utemeljujejo in osmišljajo izrecna pravna pravila. Hkrati pa se želi izogniti diskreciji in samovolji, zato naj bodo upoštevna zgolj tista moralna načela, ki so že položena v veljavno pravo. Prepoznamo jih lahko z osmišljeno (konstruktivno) razlago pravnih norm. Osrednji del naloge se zato posveča interpretaciji prava. Kakršnakoli obravnava prava je možna le kot njegova razlaga. Razlaga naj se veljavnemu pravu prilega na takšen način, da bo ohranjen smisel (»point«) pravil in celotnega pravnega sistema. Zagovarjan je pristop k pravu, ki je na pol poti med pravnim pozitivizmom in pravnim pragmatizmom – pravo kot integriteta. Od države in državljanov zahteva spoštovanje istih vrednot, na načelen in koherenten način. Sodniki naj pravni sistem razumejo kot smiselno celoto, ki izraža skladna pojmovanja pravičnosti in poštenosti. Tako bodo lahko v vseh primerih le odkrili že veljavne pravice in ne izumljali novih. Zadnji del naloge se ukvarja s konstruktivno razlago zakonov (splošnih in abstraktnih pravnih aktov), kar je še posebno relevantno za evropski pravni prostor. Ves čas se delo navezuje na ameriškega pravnega filozofa Ronalda Dworkina, prodornega misleca, ki pa je (bil) v Sloveniji deležen presenetljivo malo pozornosti.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:moralno razumevanje prava, pravna načela, konstruktivna razlaga, interpretativna teorija prava, integriteta, Ronald Dworkin
Work type:Master's thesis/paper (mb22)
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Year:2018
COBISS.SI-ID:16145233 Link is opened in a new window
Views:973
Downloads:399
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Moral understanding of law
Abstract:
The master's thesis in the broadest sense discusses the relationship between law and morality. It argues that, in order to properly understand the law, it is necessary to take into account moral principles that justify explicit legal rules. At the same time, it wants to avoid discretion and arbitrariness, and therefore only the moral principles already embedded in the applicable law should be relevant. We can recognize this “embedded moral principles” with a constructive interpretation of legal norms. The main part of the thesis is therefore devoted to the interpretation of the law. Any approach to law is possible only as an interpretation of it. The interpretation should fit the legal material in such a way, that the point of the rules and the entire legal system is preserved. Thesis advocates understanding of law, which is halfway between legal positivism and legal pragmatism – law as integrity. It requires the state and the citizens to respect the same values in a principled and coherent way. Judges should understand the legal system as a meaningful whole, which reflects harmonious concepts of justice and fairness. This way, they will be able to discover the existing rights in all cases and will not be inventing new ones. The last part of the thesis deals with the constructive interpretation of Statues (general and abstract legal instruments), which is particularly relevant for the European legal area. At all times, the paper relates to the American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, a prodigious thinker, who has received surprisingly little attention in Slovenian literature.

Keywords:moral understanding of law, legal principles, constructive interpretation, interpretative theory of law, integrity, Ronald Dworkin

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