Belief without representation

Klauser, Florian (avtor)

In this article , I set o ff to explore the question “What is belief?” from a first - person perspective. Finding the explanations in analytical philosophy insufficient, I delve into the phenomenological tradition – starting with Edmund Husserl ’ s concept of the horizon. In doing so, I find that the phenomenological tradition seems to contradict the presupposition of beliefs as representations. Directing my attention to finding an alternative explanation, I present Hubert Dreyfus ’ explanation of learning without representations, but sh ow that (by Dreyfus ’ own admission) he does not truly take a decisive step away from representationalism. I present the idea of enaction as a proper alternative to representations. Within this new framework, I present the idea of sense - making as a potentia l direction towards an answer to the question at hand

• Jezik: Slovenski jezik
• Ključne besede: zavest
• Vrsta gradiva: Članek v reviji
• Tipologija: 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
• Organizacija: PEF - Pedagoška fakulteta
• Založnik: Zagreb : Znanost.org society
• Leto izida: 2017
• Št. strani: 242-250
• Številčenje: 15
• PID: 20.500.12556/RUL-99223
• ISSN: 1334-4676
• COBISS.SI-ID: 11887177
• Datum objave v RUL: 31.01.2018

Sekundarni jezik

• Jezik: Angleški jezik
• Ključne besede: consciousness