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Belief without representation
ID
Klauser, Florian
(
Avtor
)
URL - Predstavitvena datoteka, za dostop obiščite
http://pefprints.pef.uni-lj.si/4936/
Galerija slik
Izvleček
In this article , I set o ff to explore the question “What is belief?” from a first - person perspective. Finding the explanations in analytical philosophy insufficient, I delve into the phenomenological tradition – starting with Edmund Husserl ’ s concept of the horizon. In doing so, I find that the phenomenological tradition seems to contradict the presupposition of beliefs as representations. Directing my attention to finding an alternative explanation, I present Hubert Dreyfus ’ explanation of learning without representations, but sh ow that (by Dreyfus ’ own admission) he does not truly take a decisive step away from representationalism. I present the idea of enaction as a proper alternative to representations. Within this new framework, I present the idea of sense - making as a potentia l direction towards an answer to the question at hand
Jezik:
Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:
zavest
Vrsta gradiva:
Članek v reviji
Tipologija:
1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:
PEF - Pedagoška fakulteta
Založnik:
Zagreb : Znanost.org society
Leto izida:
2017
Št. strani:
242-250
Številčenje:
15
PID:
20.500.12556/RUL-99223
ISSN:
1334-4676
COBISS.SI-ID:
11887177
Datum objave v RUL:
31.01.2018
Število ogledov:
961
Število prenosov:
161
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Jezik:
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Ključne besede:
consciousness
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