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Učinki vertikalnih koncentracij v EU
ID Ilić, Aleksander (Author), ID Grilc, Peter (Mentor) More about this mentor... This link opens in a new window

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MD5: E5820F25477622D11275F399F26EAC66
PID: 20.500.12556/rul/d4bd3739-c10a-4686-b03f-2ab14d521ccc

Abstract
Na podlagi 3. člena PDEU je EU izključno pristojna za vzpostavitev pravil o konkurenci, ki so potrebna za delovanje skupnega trga. Pravo EU določa, da je potrebno koncentracije, ki imajo razsežnosti Skupnosti, predhodno priglasiti Evropski Komisiji. Vertikalne koncentracije nastanejo med podjetji, ki delujejo na različnih a dopolnilnih oziroma komplementarnih stopnjah oskrbne verige. V večini primerov vertikalne integracije koristijo potrošnikom, saj omogočajo nižje cene končnih proizvodov oziroma njihovo kakovostnejšo dobavo. Vendar so posledice za konkurenco lahko tudi škodljive. Glavno skrb predstavlja možnost izključitve s trga, še posebej na trgih, kjer je število dobaviteljev ali distributerjev majhno. Ločimo dve obliki izključitev. Izključitev pri surovinah nastane, ko je verjetno, da bo zaradi preprečevanja dostopa do pomembnih surovin, koncentracija zvišala stroške konkurentov na spodnjem delu oskrbne verige, medtem ko je pri izključitvi pri strankah verjetno, da bo združeni subjekt izključil konkurente na zgornjem delu oskrbne verige in jim omejeval dostop do zadostne mreže strank. Komisija je za presojo skladnosti koncentracij s pravom EU izoblikovala t. i. pristop v treh korakih, kjer preuči zmožnosti za izključitev, spodbude ter domnevni skupni vpliv na učinkovito konkurenco. V primeru verjetnih protikonkurenčnih učinkov, bo moral združeni subjekt sprejeti določene zaveze, ali pa bo Komisija prepovedala koncentracijo.

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:omejevanje konkurence, vertikalne koncentracije, učinkovitosti, neusklajeni učinki, izključitev pri surovinah, izključitev pri strankah
Work type:Master's thesis/paper
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Year:2017
PID:20.500.12556/RUL-92808 This link opens in a new window
COBISS.SI-ID:15706193 This link opens in a new window
Publication date in RUL:04.07.2017
Views:2554
Downloads:642
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Effects of vertical concentrations in the EU
Abstract:
Based on the third article of the PDEU, the European Union is exclusively competent in establishing the rules of competition, which are necessary for the common market to function. The Law of EU determines, that the concentrations, which have the dimensions of the European Community, have to notify the European Commission beforehand. Vertical concentrations are formed among companies which function on different, yet complementary levels of the supply chain. In most cases vertical integrations are beneficiary to consumers, because they allow for lower end product prices and for a better quality of delivery. On the other hand, the consequences that affect the competition can also be harmful. The main concern is the possibility of exclusion from the market, especially on markets, where the number of suppliers or distributers is low. We separate two forms of exclusions. Exclusion with raw materials occurs, when it is likely that because of the prevention of access to important materials, the integration raises costs for the competition in the bottom section of the supply chain, meanwhile when in the exclusion of customers is likely, that the merged subject will exclude the competition on the upper section of the supply chain and limit their access to a sufficient client network. The Commission has formed a so called three step approach, to judge the compliance of concentrations with the EU Law, where it studies the abilities to foreclose, incentives and the alleged common impact on an effective competition. In case of a likely anticompetitive effects, the merged subject will have to accept certain commitment, or the Commission will forbid the merger.

Keywords:restriction of competition, vertical concentrations, uncoordinated effects, input foreclosure, customer foreclosure

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