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Škodljiva navodila obvladujoče družbe v dejanskem koncernu
ID
Jevnikar, Sabina
(
Author
),
ID
Podobnik, Klemen
(
Mentor
)
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PID:
20.500.12556/rul/2fb9c583-72a2-4b86-99b8-3cc4bd3c16dc
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Abstract
Gospodarske družbe se v koncerne povezujejo predvsem z namenom uspešnejšega poslovanja. Za dejanski koncern je značilno razmerje podrejenosti, v katerem ena ali več odvisnih družb deluje pod enotnim vodstvom obvladujoče družbe. Družb tako ne varujemo pred odvisnostjo, ampak pred škodljivim vplivanjem obvladujoče družbe, ki bi odvisni družbi utegnil povzročiti prikrajšanje. Zakon o gospodarskih družbah, kljub svoji varovalni naravi, vsebuje izjemo imenovano koncernski privilegij. Obvladujoča družba tako lahko izvaja tudi škodljive vplive, a le pod pogojem, da je prikrajšanje kasneje izravnano na način, ki ga določa zakon. V praksi se pojavljajo težave, ker prikrajšanja, ki so bila povzročena s škodljivimi navodili obvladujoče družbe, niso nadomeščena. Poslovodstva odvisne družbe sicer ne priznavajo, da bi imela v praksi težave s škodljivimi navodili, vendar obstajajo izjeme, ki so potrdile delovanje v svojo škodo zaradi izvrševanja pritiska s strani uprave obvladujoče družbe in strahu pred morebitnimi sankcijami. Za slabše poslovanje odvisne družbe, ki je posledica škodljivih navodil, je krivo tudi slabo poznavanje zakonodaje na tem področju. Poslovodstva morebiti niti ne vedo, da lahko v takem primeru zahtevajo izravnavo prikrajšanja in za druge varovalne institute, ki jih določa zakon.
Language:
Slovenian
Keywords:
Dejanski koncern
,
odvisna družba
,
obvladujoča družba
,
škodljiva navodila
,
koncernski privilegij
,
izravnava prikrajšanja
,
ZGD-1
Work type:
Bachelor thesis/paper
Organization:
PF - Faculty of Law
Year:
2017
PID:
20.500.12556/RUL-92761
COBISS.SI-ID:
15670865
Publication date in RUL:
03.07.2017
Views:
3844
Downloads:
982
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Language:
English
Title:
Harmful instructions of the dominant company in a factual concern
Abstract:
Companies merge into groups in order to improve their business performance. A corporate group is typically characterised by hierarchy where one or several dependent companies operate under single leadership of the dominant company. In this way, corporations are not protected from independence, but rather from harmful instructions of the dominant company that may cause a loss. Although the Companies Act is of a protective nature, it contains an exception called a privilege in a concern. The dominant company can exercise harmful instructions on condition that the loss is subsequently compensated in a way specified in the Act. In practice, however, losses caused by harmful instructions from the dominant company are not compensated. Central management teams of dependent companies claim that they are not experiencing any issues with harmful instructions in practice. But some exceptions confirmed having acted to their own detriment due to pressures from the dominant company and fear of potential sanctions. Less successful performance of dependent groups on account of harmful instructions can also be attributed to insufficient knowledge of relevant legislation. Management teams are perhaps unaware of the option to claim loss compensation or use other protective institutes contained in the Act.
Keywords:
factual concern
,
dependent company
,
dominant company
,
harmful instructions
,
privilege in a concern
,
loss compensation
,
ZGD-1
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